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I. INTRODUCTION: US POLICY TOWARDS THE PHILIPPINES 
VIS-À-VIS THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM  
In 2004, the United States (US) has entered its third year of waging the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) which began with coordinated attacks on 
American soil by Al-Qaeda1 operatives the morning of 11 September 2001.  This 
event has not only impacted American hearts and minds; it dramatically shifted 
the national focus onto international terrorism.  9/112 has reshaped US priorities 
and policy.  President George W. Bush stated, “…we will prosecute the war on 
terror with patience and focus and determination. With the help of a broad 
coalition, we will make certain that terrorists and their supporters are not safe in 
any cave or corner of the world.”3  National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
claimed, “[September 11th] also threw into sharp relief the nature of the threats 
we face today.  Today’s threats come less from massing armies than from small, 
shadowy bands of terrorists – less from strong states than from weak or failed 
states.”4   
Washington has taken on a multi-leveled approach to countering 
terrorism, melding a military component with active bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy and foreign aid packages.  The United States is also leading a 
coalition of allied nations, spanning both hemispheres and stretching from 
Western Europe to the Middle East to Southeast Asia.5  Many countries have 
                                            
1 Also spelled Al Qaeda, Al-Qaida, and Al Qaida. 
2 “9/11” refers to the events as well as the date of  11 September 2001 (also known to as 
“September 11th”) 
3 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.  Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002.  30 April 
2003, Section A: Introduction.  (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/ accessed January 
2004).    
4 Office of the Press Secretary.  “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses President’s National Security 
Strategy, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York.”  1 October 2002.  
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html accessed January 2004). 
5 Countries providing support in the GWOT include: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Jordan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, 
Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan.  Source: Gerry J. Gilmore.  “Rumsfeld 
Praises Coalition Contributions in Anti-terror War.”  DefenseLINK News.  
(http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002/n02262002_200202262.html accessed May 2004)  
2 
condemned the terror acts of 9/11, and have pledged their support to the United 
States and its war on international terrorism.  In Southeast Asia, the strongest 
response came from Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo: “The 
Philippines stands together with the United States and the community of nations 
in a common effort to contain and to destroy terrorists and their global 
networks.”6  Hers was the first voice in Asia to support US action in Afghanistan 
by offering access to Philippine airspace, former American military installations 
Clark Airbase and Subic Bay Naval Base, as well as deploying combat troops 
and humanitarian relief towards the war effort (Appendix A contains maps of the 
Republic of the Philippines).  Terrorism is an acute threat extending throughout 
the archipelago; since independence in 1946, Manila has struggled against its 
fair share of domestic uprisings, guerilla warfare, and terror tactics from various 
insurgent groups, especially Muslim separatists and communist rebels.  Now the 
war against terror has ushered in a global forum in which to focus on combating 
terrorist and rebel groups on an international level.   
A. TERRORISM DEFINED 
Before delving into the controversial topic of terrorism, it is important to 
first explore the definitions – or in some cases, lack thereof – of this and 
associated terms.  In regards to “terrorism,” incidentally, the international 
community itself does not have a uniform definition.  Take the touch-in-cheek 
adage “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter;” a terrorist in one 
area may be ideologically considered a freedom fighter elsewhere.  Merriam-
Webster defines terrorism simply as “the systematic use of terror especially as a 
means of coercion.”7  The working definition for terrorism and associated words 
within US government circles is found in Title 22 of the United States Code, 
Section 2656f(d): “Terrorism,” it states, is “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
                                            
6 Office of the President.  “PGMA’s Message Reiterating the Philippine Government Support on 
the US Action Against Terrorism.”  8 October 2001.  (http://www.opnet.ops.gov.ph/ops-
speeches2001.htm accessed January 2004)  
7 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=terrorist accessed January 2004)  
3 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”  Thus a “terrorist 
group” practices terrorism.  Subsequently, “international terrorism” involves 
citizens or territory of more than one country.8  The Philippine government’s 
definition of terrorism is analogous to the US proposition: 
The premeditated use or threatened use of violence or means of 
destruction perpetrated against innocent civilians or non-
combatants, or against civilian and government properties, usually 
intended to influence an audience.  Its purpose is to create a state of 
fear that will aid in extorting, coercing, intimidating, or causing 
individuals and groups to alter their behavior.  Its methods, among 
others, are hostage taking, piracy or sabotage, assassination, 
threats, hoaxes, and indiscriminate bombings or shootings.9   
The United Nations (UN) has still to formulate its official definition within 
the new international environment:  “The General Assembly's Sixth Committee is 
currently considering a draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism which would include a definition of terrorism if adopted.”10  However, 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime compiled its own position, in use 
since 1988: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, 
for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast 
to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main 
targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally 
chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively 
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and 
serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based 
communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
                                            
8 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.  Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002.  30 April 
2003, Section A: Introduction.  (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/ accessed January 
2004).    
9 Francisco L. Tolin.  “The Response of the Philippine Government and the Role of the AFP in 
Addressing Terrorism.”  National Defense College of the Philippines online featured paper.  
(http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/tokyopaper.htm accessed May 2004).   
10 Counter Terrorism Committee of the United Nations.  “A Definition of Terrorism.”  2003.   
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/definition.html accessed January 2004).  
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demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether 
intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.11 
The countries of Southeast Asia, which collectively form the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), can not agree on a single definition.  Instead 
of directly defining the term, ASEAN 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism, signed 5 November 2001, operationalizes the effects of terrorism as a 
“direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of 
ASEAN…” and denounces terrorist acts as “profound threat to international 
peace and security which require concerted action to protect and defend all; 
peoples and the peace and security of the world.”12  Indeed, terrorism does not 
have a uniform definition even amongst coalition partners.  Moreover, some 
countries do not recognize some organizations as terrorist-related.  Thus 
combating terrorism can become somewhat contentious when working within an 
ambiguous and debated paradigm. 
B. OVERALL US GOALS AND PRIORITIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Since the events of 9/11, there has been a clear shift in Washington’s 
focus on international terrorism.  Three key governmental documents outline and 
publicize the Bush administration’s top goals and priorities in the GWOT: the 
National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism (NSCT), and the Department of State’s annual Patterns of 
Global Terrorism.  Most controversial of these three reports is the NSS, released 
17 September 2002; it was not only the first official post-9/11 document, but also 
the first strategy statement of the Bush administration.  According to John Lewis 
Gaddis, this particular NSS could very well be the most sweeping shift in US 
grand strategy since the Cold War.13  Dubbed the “Bush Doctrine,” it states a 
clear transitioning from deterrence, as prescribed by Clinton’s presidency, to a 
                                            
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  “Definitions of Terrorism.”  2004.  
(http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html accessed May 2004).  
12 Rommel C. Banlaoi.  The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Quezon City: Strategic and 
Integrative Studies Center, 2003, p. 9 
13 John Lewis Gaddis.  “A Grand Strategy of Transformation.”  Foreign Policy.  Iss. 133.  
November/December 2002, p. 50 
5 
policy of preemption.  The strategic aim of this report is “to help make the world 
not just safer but better,” a clear reflection of a new “distinctly American 
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”14  
While the NSS is a more general strategy, the NSCT focuses on combating and 
defeating terrorist organizations and those regimes or sponsors who harbor 
them, as well as stresses the role of international cooperation, law enforcement, 
and economic development in countering terrorism.  The document’s aim is 
“identifying and diffusing threats before they reach our borders.”15  Lastly, 
Patterns of Global Terrorism, published by the US State Department, 
emphasizes the international scope of the war on terrorism, claiming that its 
ultimate success “will hinge in large part on two factors – sustained international 
political will and effective capacity building.”16  Based on these three key 
documents, we can ascertain US goals and priorities in the war on terrorism as 
the following (in no rank order): 
• Defeat terrorists and their networks, while denying their sponsorship, 
support, and sanctuary, and diminishing underlying conditions in which 
they can survive, thrive, and spread.   
• Secure and prevent future terrorist acts against American citizens and 
interests at home and abroad. 
• Forge and strengthen relations with other states in order to combat 
international terrorism and prevent attacks. 
• Assist states in bolstering their capacity to fight terrorism. 
• Promote and emphasize international cooperation in key areas, such 
as border security, information-sharing, and improved legislation.   
                                            
14 The White House.  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  
Washington D.C.: The White House, September 2002, p. 1 
15 The White House.  The National Strategy for Countering Terrorism.  Washington D.C.: The 
White House, February 2003, p. 2 
16 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.  Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002.  30 April 
2003, Section A: Introduction.  (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/ accessed January 
2004).    
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• Promote and ensure political freedom, open societies, and democratic 
institutions, along with economic development, opportunity, and growth 
through free markets and free trade.   
• Defuse regional conflicts by building international relationships and 
institutions to help manage local crises.   
• Champion aspirations for and respect of human dignity and rights. 
It is clear the United States recognizes that this war on terrorism is waged 
on the global scale, through international dialogue, bilateral relations, and military 
operations.  With increased instances of and connections with transnational 
terrorism, its porous borders, and rise in domestic rebel militancy, Southeast Asia 
has become an ever-important focus of US counter-terrorism (CT) efforts, and 
thus shifting foreign assistance priorities towards Asia.17  Foreign aid has 
become one of the main tools in extending US GWOT goals and policy to the 
region.  Since 9/11, aid levels accelerated.  According to Larry Nowels in a 2003 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) study for Congress on foreign operations 
and aid appropriations, just prior to 9/11, total development and security 
assistance to the region was originally suppose to increase from 6.5% in fiscal 
year (FY) 2001 to 8% in FY2002.  After the onset of the GWOT, Washington 
pledged increases in foreign aid of upwards of 250%, depending on country and 
situation.18  If the Middle East is the front line of the war on terror, then Southeast 
Asia, in particular the Philippines, is considered the “second front.” 
C. US GWOT GOALS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
For much of the last decade, the Philippines has been below the US 
political radar.  Since the closures of American military installations in 1991, 
including Clark Airbase and Subic Bay Naval Base, US-Philippine relations have 
been somewhat strained.  Additionally, the country had not received the level of 
strategic, anti-communism attention it once held during the Cold War.  Numerous 
                                            
17 Thomas Lum.  US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients (RL31362).    
Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 April 2002, p. 1 
18 Larry Nowels.  Appropriations for FY2004: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs (RL31811).  Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 21 July 2003, summary 
7 
acts of terror and violence prior to 9/11 in many Southeast Asian countries were 
regarded as local uprisings and insurgencies; the region was not considered a 
major center of transnational terrorism, unlike the Middle East.19   
However, 9/11 has reshaped perception of the terrorist threat in Southeast 
Asia, culminating with the rise in international terror groups and the Bali bombing.  
According to Rommel C. Banlaoi, the region is vulnerable to terrorist penetration 
because of its porous borders, weak law enforcement capabilities and 
governmental institutions, as well as its ties with the United States and other 
Western states.20  The Philippines, as a “country of convenience,”21 has long 
been a breading ground for international terrorist cells and radical jihadists.  
Intelligence sources unearthed evidence linking organization within the 
Philippines with Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network.  Al-Qaeda had been 
using the country as a major planning bed for many international acts of terror.  It 
was reported that Muhammad Jamal al-Khalifa was directed by his brother-in-
law, Bin Laden, to recruit Muslim Filipinos to fight against the Soviet forces in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.  Supposedly, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
sent thousands to Afghanistan to train and fight.22  Since then, Filipino radicals 
have been training in Al-Qaeda-run camps, returning to the Philippines with 
renewed vigor and expertise.23  Furthermore, they forged comradery with other 
(non-Filipino) radicals and jihadists, who in turn came to the archipelago to hide, 
train, organize, and plan.  It was also reported that Ramzi Yousef, the Al-Qaeda 
ringleader of 1993 World Trade Center bombing, planned in the Philippines the 
                                            
19 Rommel C. Banlaoi.  The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Quezon City: Strategic and 
Integrative Studies Center, 2003, p. 16 
20 Ibid, p. 17 
21 According to Zachary Abuza, the Philippines is a “country of convenience” for terrorists due to 
its fluid borders, lack of governmental penetration into the Muslim-controlled region, and ease of 
hiding.  Source:  Zachary Abuza.  Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror.  Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2003, p. 18 
22 Rommel C. Banlaoi.  “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign 
Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia.  Vol. 24, 
no. 2, August 2002, p. 300 
23 Zachary Abuza.  Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror.  Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2003, p. 11 
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Bojinka plots, which included the assassination of Pope John Paul II, who visited 
Manila in 1995, as well as the bombing and/or crashing of 11 American airliners 
into various significant landmarks, including the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon – as some would claim, an eerie precursor to the 9/11.24  In addition, 
Al-Qaeda is reported to have funneled money, weapons, and training to local 
Muslim extremists, including Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).25  Thus far, transnational 
organizations Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya (JI), as well as the home-grown 
ASG, Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New 
People’s Army (NPA), are all active in the Philippines and have been designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) by the US State Department.26  
With Manila on board as a major coalition partner, what are the specific 
US goals and priorities towards the Philippines in the GWOT?  While the NSS, 
NSCT, and Patterns of Global Terrorism communicate general and overarching 
goals and priorities, they can also be extended to countering terrorism in the 
Philippines.  Based on these three key documents, US GWOT goals toward the 
Philippines are the following (in no rank order): 
• Eradicate terrorists, their networks, and their activities within the 
Philippines, including Al-Qaeda, ASG, and JI.  
• Secure and prevent future terrorist acts against American and 
Philippine citizens and interests.  
• Strengthen bilateral relations with the Philippines in order to combat 
terrorism. 
• Bolster the Philippine government’s CT capacity. 
• Promote multilateral cooperation with Southeast Asian states in key 
areas, such as border security, information sharing, improved 
legislation, and law enforcement. 
                                            
24 Rommel C. Banlaoi.  “The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the Global Campaign 
Against Terrorism: Implications for Regional Security.”  Contemporary Southeast Asia.  Vol. 24, 
no. 2, August 2002, p. 301 
25 Brian Nichiporuk.  “Regional Demographics and the War on Terrorism.”  RUSI Journal.  Vol 
148, no. 1, February 2003, p. 26 
26 The MILF is not designated an FTO. 
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• Promote socio-economic development within the Philippines. 
• Assist in the resolution of conflict within the Philippines. 
• Champion the protection and respect of human rights within the 
Philippines. 
However, many scholars and pundits claim that these above points are 
not the only priorities for the United States.  In fact, major goals for the region are 
indirectly tied to the GWOT, or even go beyond its scope, using the war on terror 
discourse as a cover for or facilitator of other non-CT goals or quasi-official 
objectives, including the following (in no rank order):    
• Promote American strategic and economic interests in both the 
Philippines and greater Southeast Asia.  With the region back in 
Washington’s scope, Rommel Banlaoi contends that the war on 
terrorism provides an excellent justification to re-assert its strategic 
presence.  Since 1991, US military footprint in the region has 
decreased.  With the onset of the GWOT, the military can re-establish 
its presence in the Philippines.  Moreover, economics and trade are at 
stakes; not only is the Philippines a major trading partner, it is also a 
major destination for American investment.27  
• Contain China.  As a potential peer competitor in world affairs, the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses significant economic, military, 
and political challenges to the United States.28  Long-term regional 
hegemony may be up for grabs.     
• Control of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs).  The South China 
Sea is one of the most significant and busiest international sea lanes.  
According to Banlaoi, an increased US presence due to the war on 
terror in the region can enhance military and economic control over of 
                                            
27 Rommel C. Banlaoi.  The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Quezon City: Strategic and 
Integrative Studies Center, 2003, p. 77-78 
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the SLOCs, which are critical to the movement of forces, as well as a 
potentially important oil reserve.29 
According to critics of the war on terrorism, the GWOT has opened up 
opportunities for Washington to pursue these non-direct CT objectives by linking 
them to the greater CT campaign.  Containing China and managing the SLOCs 
can be construed as heightened security concerns by relating them to the rising 
threat of international terrorism within the region, therefore justifying an increased 
US presence.   
D. US INVOLVEMENT IN PAST PHILIPPINES INSURGENCIES 
Despite the GWOT, the issue of terrorism and insurgency in the 
Philippines and US involvement is nothing new.  Throughout Philippine history of 
Spanish colonialization, American annexation, Japanese occupation, and 
independence, local rebels and insurgents have been challenging the central 
government.  Since its initial involvement in the Philippines in 1898, the US 
government has implemented differing counter-insurgency (CI)/CT policies 
rooted in US national interest and the global environment.  Three key movements 
have been met with strong and distinct US CI/CT goals and policies: the 
Katipunan nationalist rebel uprising, the Huk rebellion, and the communist 
insurgencies under martial law; the latter two cases were a combined Manila-
Washington approach to combating insurgencies. 
1. Katipunan and the Philippine-American War 
The 1898 Spanish-American War in the Philippines islands not only saw 
combat between the Spanish empire and US military; the Katipunan, an 
organization of Filipino nationalists, had already been engaged in their own 
liberation struggle for several years.  This insurgency movement allied itself with 
American military forces towards a common goal of overthrowing the Spanish 
colonial government, believing that the United States would help them in their 
fight for independence.  On 12 June 1898, Katipunan leaders declared the 
Philippines independent from Spain, and established its revolutionary 
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government in the new capital city of Malolos, a market town located thirty-two 
kilometers north of Manila.30  Unbeknownst to the rebel leaders, the United 
States was in negotiations with Spain to end their war.  After months of talks, the 
Treaty of Paris was signed on 10 December 1898, resulting in annexation of the 
Philippines31 to the United States for the sum of $20 million.32  President William 
McKinley declared that the new American policy would be one of "benevolent 
assimilation," in which "the mild sway of justice and right" would be substituted 
for "arbitrary rule."33  Thus the Philippines became a US colony; the nationalists 
found themselves under a new colonial administration.   
The treaty settlement enraged many Filipinos.  Katipunan leaders issued 
their own counter proclamation to the Treaty of Paris, condemning the "violent 
and aggressive seizure" by the United States and threatening war with their one-
time ally.34  Thus the Philippine-American War, also known as the Philippine 
Insurrection, began on 4 February 1899, a bloody and protracted battle lasting 
almost three years, much longer than the initial war with Spain.   
US national interests were best served with the preservation of the 
Philippine colony, and policy focused on combating nationalist insurgents through 
traditional military CI means.  Although the Filipino rebels proved to be 
formidable opponents in guerrilla warfare due to years of experience against the 
Spanish, they were still no match for Americans in open combat.  The US army 
stepped up their CI operations and captured the revolutionary capital Malolos on 
31 March 1899.35  The war continued until the capture of top Katipunan leaders; 
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thus on 4 July 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the Philippine 
insurrection was over.36  From the beginning of the Spanish-American War to the 
end of the Philippine-American War, US policy and national interests had shifted 
from alliance with the insurgents against a common enemy, Spanish colonial 
power, to military suppression of the same movement. 
2. The Huk Rebellion 
After World War II, the onset of the Cold War, and Philippine 
independence in July 1946, the country was well-entrenched as an integral part 
of the American security umbrella.  Top on US Cold War priority was the signing 
of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) in March 1947 and control of twenty-
three military installations, including Clark Airbase and Subic Bay naval facilities, 
through a ninety-nine year lease.37  The Cold War had elevated the “Red 
Menace” – the Soviet Union and its communist system – as the highest threat to 
American safety and national interest.  Thus US CI goals in the Philippines 
involved suppressing anti-communist insurgencies and maintaining global 
stability.38   
In the newly independent Philippines, the main source of domestic unrest 
came from the Huks.  Established as the People’s Anti-Japanese Army, the 
Hukba ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon (Hukbalahap for short), originally comprised of 
anti-Japanese communists and socialists, was in fact the strongest force against 
the occupying enemy at the height of World War II.39  The Huks, members of the 
Hukbalahap movement, successfully fought against Japanese forces, seized the 
abandoned farm land and plantations left by the landlord elites who fled to Manila 
for safety, and took over local governance.40  These Huks also proved to be 
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extremely helpful to the American war effort by acting as guides and intelligence 
sources for US troops.41  However, after the war, anti-government sentiments 
grew in the rural area.  The Huks and their peasantry supporters refused to turn 
over land and governance to the returning landlords and elite.  Instead, they 
embraced socialist and communist ideals, including economic equality, and 
called for political and economic reforms from Manila.  Amidst reports of political 
corruption and police brutality in rural villages, Huk-led insurgencies increased.  
There is still much debate over the true nature of the Huk movement.  
Some scholars maintain that the Hukbalahap was merely an anti-Japanese, anti-
corruption, anti-poverty, and pro-land reform organization comprised of poor 
peasants and farmers.  Other experts, including many American intelligence 
sources at the time of the insurgencies, suggested that the Huks sought “to 
further the objectives of world Communism.”42  Thus due to their communist 
affiliation, the Huks were viewed as a threat to US interests and to the Philippine 
government in the Cold War, and were targets for anti-communist and CI 
campaigns.   
As the rebellion spread across the country, Minister of National Defense 
Ramon Magsaysay, turned to Washington for assistance in defeating this 
insurgency.  The 1950 Truman Doctrine stated that the United States would help 
stabilize legal foreign governments threatened by revolutionary minorities and 
outside pressures.  Moreover, Washington formulated a new CI policy, one that 
emphasized political initiatives over military efforts which ended the Katipunan 
rebellion.43  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative and US Air Force 
Colonel Edward Geary Lansdale was sent to the Philippines in September 1950, 
and developed a plan to defeat the insurgents militarily while winning popular 
support for the government – in effect, turning the tables on the Huks and their 
reform agenda.  With US aid and advisers, he could improve the quality, 
                                            
41 Ibid, p. 340 
42 Ibid, p. 336 
43 Walden Bello. “Counterinsurgency’s Proving ground: Low-Intensity Warfare in the Philippines.”  
Low Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties.  New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1988, p. 160 
14 
effectiveness, and CI techniques of the Philippine armed forces.44  In order to 
draw popular support away from the Huks, Lansdale focused his political strategy 
around two key platforms: the “clean” congressional elections of 1951 to restore 
the damaged reputation of the government, and Magsaysay’s program of “free 
land” for the rebels who would lay down their arms.45  This new policy directly 
countered Huk’s reform agenda upon which much of the popular support laid.  
Slowly, the rebellion crumbled as Lansdale’s strategy diffused Huk ideology until 
the final surrender of top leadership.  As David Sturtevant, an expert on peasant 
movements, claimed, “The [Huk] movement was not shattered by reforms; rather, 
it was shattered by the promise of reforms.  That was enough.”46  Again, the 
United States played an active role in CI campaigns in the Philippines, this time 
working closely with Manila to focus on a political- and economic-based strategy 
rather than a purely military approach to defeat the insurgents. 
3. The CPP and NPA Under Martial Law 
Amidst the Cold War and the Marcos administration emerged the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), established in December 1968 by 
young revolutionaries and former Hukbalahap.  This organization rooted in 
Maoist ideals, along with its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), 
embraced a land reform agenda, led insurgencies throughout the archipelago, 
and conducted guerilla operations against Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP).47  Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos blamed the communists and 
other leftist uprising for the rash of violence in the country, and declared martial 
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law in 1972.48  Quietly, the United States supported his proclamation; in a 
classified 1972 US Senate memo, Washington agreed with Marcos’s action, 
citing “that these objectives are in our interests; and that military bases and a 
familiar government in the Philippines are more important than the preservation 
of democratic institutions.”49  Both the status of US military bases and a strong 
anti-communist government were high on the American priority list for the 
Philippines.  Hundreds of millions of dollars in military and economic aid were 
given to the Marcos administration.  According to Donald Hamilton, deputy chief 
of mission in Manila during the Nixon administration, American policy towards the 
Philippines in the early 1970s was intended to serve US national interests.50  
Despite the imposition of martial law, the Nixon administration, determined to 
retain key military posts, increased military assistance; from 1972 to 1975, aid 
grew by 100 percent. And although repeated urges for restored democratic 
processes and human rights practices, President Jimmy Carter signed the new 
1979 basing agreement which guaranteed to President Marcos $300 million in 
military aid and $200 million in economic support funds (ESF) over the next five 
years.  President Ronald Reagan was an avid supporter of Ferdinand Marcos, 
granting $425 million in military aid in 1983.51   
One justification for martial law was the suppression of leftist insurgencies; 
however, communist uprisings increased.  CPP leader Jose Marie Sison 
declared that the Philippines was being “ruthlessly exploited” by American 
imperialists, as well as its own “comprador big bourgeoisie” landed elites, 
capitalists, and governmental bureaucrats.  He believed that the only way to 
overthrow the US-Marcos regime was an armed proletariat revolution targeting 
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the exploiting classes and imperialists, freeing peasants and workers from their 
oppression.52  The communists’ message found much support throughout the 
country; by the time Corazon Aquino took office in 1986, there were an estimated 
22,500 NPA rebels, and the CPP controlled 20 percent of the archipelago’s 
40,000 villages.53  Subsequent administrations inherited the communist 
insurgency problem from President Marcos, although CPP popular support has 
waxed and waned over the decades.  Today, both the CPP and the NPA are still 
well entrenched in many interior villages and actively engaged in terrorist and 
insurgent activities; both organizations have been placed on the US State 
Department’s FTO list.  Moreover, CI policy during the Marcos administration 
encompasses large amounts of foreign aid to combat communist rebels.        
Thus before the current international war on terror, the United States 
played an active role against insurgencies, guerilla tactics, and terror activities in 
the Philippines.  In each of the three cases, US CI policy shifted depending on 
national interests and the global environment: traditional military operations to 
confront and defeat Katipunan rebels, political strategizing to placate and 
diminish support of the Huks, and large military and economic aid packages to 
the Marcos administration to eradicate communist insurgencies.  Clearly, since 
1898, the Philippines has been a key state in US foreign policy and CI/CT efforts. 
E. US GWOT POLICY TOWARDS THE PHILIPPINES 
President Bush has declared Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines, 
the second front in the war against terrorism: “The Philippine government is 
strongly committed to defeating terrorists operating in its own part of the world.  
The United States is committed to helping when asked.”54  The Bush 
administration considers the archipelago one of the major centers of current anti-
terrorism efforts due to its strategic importance, concentrated Muslim population, 
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and insurgency movements.55  Thus, based on its GWOT goals and priorities, 
Washington has created a comprehensive CT/CI policy package towards the 
Philippines, one that includes political, military, and economic aid components. 
1. Political Component of GWOT Policy 
Post 9/11 political and diplomatic relations between the two countries are 
strong, both on a state-to-state level, as well as on an individual level; these 
presidents consider each other personal friends.  Political support and state visits 
have increased on both sides.  During President Arroyo’s May 2003 visit to 
Washington, President Bush toasted her "unwavering" partnership in the war on 
terrorism: “For your leadership and friendship, I thank you.”56  He followed her 
trip with an official visit to Manila in October 2003, marking the first State Visit of 
an American President in over 30 years.  Moreover, the two presidents have 
highlighted the shared history and values between Filipinos and Americans, as 
well as a commitment to global peace, security, and prosperity.57 
In addition, both countries have increased their intelligence sharing and 
law enforcement cooperation to root out terrorist cells.  The US government has 
frozen the assets of and banned funding to FTOs active in the Philippines, 
including Al-Qaeda, JI, ASG, and CPP/NPA.58  Moreover, President Bush openly 
supports the current peace negotiations between Manila and the MILF mediated 
by Kuala Lumpur, pledging more development aid “when a lasting peace is 
established.”59  At the behest of the White House, the United States Institute of 
Peace (USIP), an independent federal organization, is facilitating dialogue to help 
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create an “equitable and durable peace agreement.”60  Washington 
acknowledges  that regional peace is key to effectively counter terrorism in the 
Philippines. 
2. Military Component of GWOT Policy  
Both presidents have discussed security challenges facing each country, 
agreeing that the US-Philippine partnership has taken on new vitality and 
importance in the context of the global war on terrorism.61  For the Bush 
administration, this security alliance is a “rock of stability in the Pacific,” and the 
United States is charged with providing “technical assistance and field expertise 
and funding” to help modernize the Philippine army.62  Both governments have 
developed a five-year plan to “modernize and reform” the AFP, as well as 
reforming and strengthening the Philippine National Police (PNP).63  Not only do 
both countries share the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), but the Philippines 
has been recently elevated to that status of a Major Non-North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) Ally of the United States64.  This designation will enable the 
Philippines to purchase surplus military equipment and supplies on a priority 
basis, as well as procure military-related loans, research and development, and 
training from the United States.65   
Washington was quick to deploy thousands of military personnel to train 
and assist the AFP in counter-terrorism operations.  The 2002 Balikatan 
(Balikatan 20-1), meaning “shoulder-to-shoulder” in the Tagalog language, was 
joint exercises aimed at training and assistance in Philippine CT capabilities 
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through intelligence gathering, planning operations, professionalizing the forces, 
and supplying much needed weapons and supplies in order to target the ASG.  
More than 1,000 US troops as trainers and advisors participated in exercises 
throughout the southern region of the Philippines, including Basilan Island, 
Zamboanga City, Mactan, and Cebu.  As a result, AFP operations improved and 
greatly diminished ASG’s stronghold in key locations, including Basilan.  
However, negotiations for the next Balikatan have been stalled; both 
governments have found difficulties in drafting the new “rules of engagement” 
and roles for American personnel on the ground.66  Moreover, Manila does not 
want to jeopardize the current peace negotiations with MILF, also inhabiting the 
conflict-ridden southern islands. 
    In addition to training and exercises, Washington has pledged millions 
in military aid and advanced military equipment, from night-vision goggle to 
combat helicopters.  The main intent of this aid is to improve AFP counter-
terrorism capabilities and self-sufficiency.  Post-9/11 military assistance 
programs, including grants, loans, and equipment, to the Philippines have 
increased ten-fold since previous levels.  In November 2001, total US military 
assistance amounted to $92 million.  In May 2003, the United States announced 
another $65 million AFP training program.67  And in his 18 October 2003 trip to 
Manila, President Bush pledged an additional $340 million aid package for 
increased AFP CT training against the ASG and other Al-Qaeda-linked 
operations in the southern Philippines.68   
Table 1 shows key military aid programs for the Philippines.  Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) funds are earmarked for improving AFP capabilities.69  
FMF levels jumped dramatically since 9/11.  While FMF may have totaled $19 
                                            
66 Mark Manyin, coordinator.  Terrorism in Southeast Asia (RL31672).    Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 7 April 2004, p. 14 
67 Ibid, p. 10-14 
68 Sheldon W. Simon.  “President Bush Presses Antiterror Agenda in Southeast Asia.”  
Comparative Connections.  October-December 2003, p. 68  
69 Thomas Lum.  US Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected Recipients (RL31362).    
Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 April 2002, p. 14 
20 
million in 2002, an additional $25 million was allocated in emergency support, 
accompanied by over $100 million towards enhancing military equipment and 
capabilities, including cargo aircraft, helicopters, two-and-a-half ton trucks, patrol 
vessels, grenade launchers, and M-16 riffles.70  In fact, the Philippines is the 
largest recipient of FMF; in 2002, the country received 80% of all FMF funds to 
East Asia.71  FY05 estimate is currently $30 million. 
Another form of security assistance is International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), geared towards improving civilian control of military and military-
to-military contacts.72  IMET levels have been consistently comparable, with on-
going training and professionalization programs and Balikatan exercises 
targeting terrorist organizations.  Ranging from $1.5 million to just under $3 
million in the 2000s, IMET aid to the Philippines is the highest in Asia, and 
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Table 1.   US Economic and Security Assistance to the Philippines, 2000-2005 (in 
million dollars) (After: CRS Reports US Foreign Aid to East and South 
Asia: Selected Recipients by Thomas Lum and Terrorism in Southeast 
Asia by Mark Manyin) 
Account FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 
requested
Child Survival 
Health (CSH) 7.20 9.45 25.60 22.92 29.35 28.00
Development 




0.00 7.20 21.00 45.00 17.65 35.00
Foreign Military 




2.00 1.44 2.03 2.40 2.70 3.00
Peace Corps 1.72 2.05 2.17 2.09 2.60 2.88




40.00 20.00 ---  --- --- ---
Totals 74.84 72.48 94.26 150.49 94.25 124.96
 
3. Economic Aid Component of GWOT Policy 
Economics have not been overlooked as a challenge to security.  
President Arroyo is a strong advocate of the linkages between political extremism 
and poverty in the Philippines: “Poverty and terrorism are twin evils that we must 
fight.”73  Post-9/11 economic assistance to the country has also accelerated, as 
per Table 1.  Much of this development aid is earmarked for the southern islands 
in conflict.  Both Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Funds 
(ESF) aid target sustainable economic growth, health care, living conditions in 
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Mindanao.74  DA levels have been steady throughout the 2000s, while ESF has 
climbed rapidly to $45 million in FY03.  FY05 projected estimates for DA and 
ESF are roughly $26 million and $435 million, respectively.  Child Survival Health 
(CSH) programs to improve infant and child health and nutrition have also 
increased since 9/11.  Since FY02, aid has exceeded $20 million, from $7.20 
million and $9.45 million for FY00 and FY01, respectively.   
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), under 
the auspices of the Secretary of State, is the principal federal agency “to extend 
assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and 
engaging in democratic reforms” and has been active in the Philippines since the 
organization’s inception in 1961.  As a response to 9/11, USAID has reshaped 
“development assistance to a nation that is one of the US government’s most 
important allies and development partners.”75  Figure 1 shows USAID assistance 
to the Philippines since 1991.  Per this chart, aid substantially dropped from 
previous levels after the end of the Cold War and the military base closures.  
However, since 2001, development assistance levels have begun to climb back 
up.  USAID assistance to Mindanao has more than doubled since 9/11, from 
$18.90 million in 2001 to $47.40 million and $41.9 million in 2002 and 2003, 
respectively.  Moreover, per Figure 2, Congress has mandated that at least 50% 
of USAID funds to the Philippines go towards development programs in 
Mindanao, as a strategic objective in regional conflict and poverty alleviation.  
Appendix C outlines the various USAID programs in the Philippines.     
In addition, in 2003, Congress passed the Emergency Wartime 
Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 1599/Public Law 108-11), in which $30 
million in ESF was earmarked “for assistance for the Philippines to further 
prospects for peace in Mindanao.”76  Moreover, Section 578 of the Consolidated 
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Appropriations Act 2004 (H.R.2673) designated $600,000 of the $30 million ESF 
funds “be available only for upgrading education and health infrastructure in the 
Sulu Archipelago.”77  Clearly, Washington is also committed to the economic 
welfare of the Philippines, particularly the conflict areas in the south. 
 
Figure 1.   USAID Assistance Levels to the Philippines, 1991-2004  
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Figure 2.   USAID Assistance to Mindanao  




F. PROPOSED HYPOTHESIS AND THESIS ARGUMENT 
Since partnership and staunch public support of the war against terrorism, 
the Philippines has received hundreds of millions of dollars in military and 
economic aid as an extension of US GWOT policy, not to mention renewed 
diplomatic and political support from Washington.  Given this level of political and 
financial commitment, I propose the following hypothesis: individuals and/or units 
within the Philippines find utility in sustaining low levels conflict in order to 
continue benefiting from current US policy vis-à-vis economic aid and political 
support.  This proposition runs contrary to the purpose of US GWOT goals and 
policies, as mention in previous subsections.  Figure 3 is a basic graphical 
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policy and terror levels, as well as the proposed relation based on the 
hypothesis. 
 
Figure 3.   Ideal and Proposed Effect of US GWOT Policy on Philippine Terrorism 
and Insurgency Levels  
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In this scenario, US GWOT policy, including its political, military, and aid 
components, is the independent variable (IV) which affects the levels of terrorism 
and insurgency in the Philippines, the dependent variable (DV).  In the top causal 
chain, the introduction of the IV affects the intervening variables by bolsters 
Philippine political will, military capabilities, and assistance levels, to include the 
passing of CT legislation, effective operations by the AFP and PNP to combat 
terrorist cells, and development programs in high conflict area to improve local 
living conditions to discourage the presence of terrorist groups and further 
recruitment.  Thus with these increases in CT effectiveness, terrorism and 
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However, the reality on the ground is that terrorism has not diminished in 
the Philippines.  Why?  Let us consider the second causal chain based on the 
hypothesis.  The introduction of the IV does not have the “ideal” or intended 
effects on the intervening variables as hoped by Washington through its GWOT 
policy.  Instead of raising CT capabilities in order to defeat terrorism, individuals 
and/or units in the Philippines find utility in and profit from US GWOT policy, thus 
perpetuating a minimum level of conflict in order to secure future benefits of the 
policy components.  The IV creates a cyclical incentive structure with leads to 
sustained or even increased levels of terrorism and conflict.  Actors within the 
incentive structure profit from the war on terror.  Thus the intended outcome of 
decreased levels or even the eradication of terrorism is never achieved.  
Economic and political opportunism in war is not a new assertion, nor is it 
just a GWOT or Philippine phenomenon.  Paul Collier found that economic 
agendas are key to understanding why civil wars and internal conflicts arise in 
certain countries (and not in others): despite grievance rhetoric, rebel groups are 
far more likely to engage in conflict if they can benefit from economic 
opportunities.78  States can also benefit from conflict as it relates to foreign aid 
levels.  For instance, states find utility in allowing some minimum level of 
terrorism to exist.  If some minimum level of terror exists, the state will receive a 
certain level of aid to combat the problem; if more terror persists, then more aid is 
received.  However, if terror is eradicated, then the state will no longer receive 
counter-terrorism aid.79  Thus, it is in the state’s best interest to preserve a 
certain level of terror to ensure the receipt of aid.   
This paper will explore and test this hypothesis of utility and incentives in 
continuing conflict to reap economic and political benefits from the war on 
terrorism and subsequent US CT policy.  Unfortunately, little if any empirical data 
is available on this topic.  Thus, we will draw from subject-matter expertise, non-
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governmental organization (NGO) findings, news reports, and scholarly 
publications to derive, apply, and test this argument.  There are four main 
chapters to this paper.  The first chapter examined US goals and priorities in the 
war on terrorism, response to Philippine 9/11 support, and current GWOT policy, 
to include military and economic aid.  Moreover, it introduced and set the logical 
framework for the overall argument of this paper.  The second chapter will focus 
on the Philippine response to 9/11 and its criticisms, as well as a background of 
counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency campaigns since independence.  The third 
chapter will explore the proposed hypothesis, investigating how the Philippine 
government, military, and insurgency groups profit from the war on terrorism and 
perpetuate conflict within the borders.  And the last chapter will summarize key 
findings and provide recommendations for future US policy and Philippine CT 
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II. PHILIPPINE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 
The growing threat of international terrorism has ushered in a renewed 
relationship between Washington and Manila, strained since the US military base 
closures in 1991.  The Arroyo administration replied with one of the most robust 
responses to call for a multilateral front against terrorist organizations and 
regimes.  Not only did Manila condemn the attacks on 9/11; the Philippines has 
had its own history of internal struggles with insurgents, separatists, and terror 
groups.  This chapter will first review the decades of civil strife against the state 
by two main insurgency groups: Muslim separatists and Communist rebel.  
Appendix D provides a much more detailed and in-depth look at these insurgent 
groups, their history, goals, and tactics.  The next section will examine the 
responses to the US-led global war on terrorism by the Philippine government 
and military, as well as address key criticism of these responses. 
A. HISTORY OF INSURGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 
1. Colonialization, Independence, and Moro Separatism 
Although the Philippine population is overwhelmingly Catholic,80 Islam in 
fact predates the arrival of Christianity.  Arab and Indian spice traders along with 
Muslim proselytizers introduced this new monotheistic religion to the archipelago 
as early as the eighth century; by the early 1500s, Islam was well entrenched in 
the southern region, specifically in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (see 
Appendix A for a detailed map of the southern islands).81 
When the Spanish traders and colonizers arrived in the Philippines in the 
mid-sixteenth century, they had high hopes of acquiring a large share of the 
spice trade.  However, their most successful endeavor was the conversion the 
indigenous population, particularly the northern islands for Luzon and the 
Visayas, to Christianity.  The southern regions, where Islam had taken root, 
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never came under colonial control and conversion.  Under Spanish 
administration, the Muslim Filipinos (collectively called the Moros) from the 
Spanish word for Moor, were politically, economically, and socially 
disenfranchised and alienated, in favor of their Christian counterparts, who were 
generally more educated and held governmental posts.82  According to Pute 
Rahimah Makol-Abdul, colonial rule and policies sowed the seeds of 
socioeconomic and political degeneration of Muslim community and unleashed 
divisive forces of Muslim-Christian alienation in the country.83  This alienation 
and animosity did not spring from competing religious views; the Moros felt that 
the converted Filipinos were Christianized allies to the Spanish enemy in the 
struggle against Islam and tools of colonial power.84  Moreover, Islam had been 
spreading towards the north, and the Moros believed that if the Spanish had not 
intercepted it, Islam would have proliferated throughout the whole country.85   
With the American victory over Spain in the 1898 war and the signing of 
the Treaty of Paris, the United States gained Spanish territories, including the 
Philippines.  Although Mindanao and the Sulu islands were never completely 
succumbed to Spanish rule, the region was included in the concessions.  The 
Moro community refused to acknowledge American annexation, and tried to 
reassert their ownership or rights to Mindanao through armed resistance, but 
were quickly defeated by the powerful US military.86  Initial American policy 
showed signs that Moro conditions would improve under this new arrangement 
than previous Spanish colonial administration; “non-interference” policies gave 
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authority to Sultans to govern their own people and freedom to practice Islam.87  
However, the policy of non-interference was short-lived, and in its place came the 
creation of the Moro Province in 1903 and direct rule from the American colonial 
government in Manila.88  Many Moro believed that the motives for earlier non-
interference policies were efforts to placate and neutralize Muslim mobilization 
during the Philippine-American War from 1899 to 1901, instead of the stated goal 
of Muslim incorporation into the greater political system.89   
Similar to Spanish control, direct rule over the Moro Province had 
disastrous effects on the Muslim population.  First, the colonial government 
supported Christian settlement into the Moro Province, despite Muslim 
resistance.90  As a result, rapid migration of Americas and Christian Filipinos 
reduced the Moro population to a numeric minority.91  In addition, the Public 
Land Acts asserted that all land, including the Moro Province, was in fact 
property of the state.  This “legalized land grab,” as Syed Serajul Islam noted, 
allowed for individual settlers to apply for private land ownership from the central 
government.  Moreover, federal loans were granted to settlers who lacked the 
finances to relocate to the south.  Thus these policies displaced the Moros of 
what they considered proprietary ancestral lands in Mindanao.92    
Secondly, Western-style education was another point of contention 
between the Moros and the American colonists.  Muslim Filipinos believed that 
this secular education taught by non-Muslim was a direct assault on traditional 
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religious learning.  Moreover, it was another attempt at placating the Moros, 
training them to be “good colonials” in order to easily control them and exploit the 
natural resources of their land.93  Distrust and resentment in the education 
system had many Moros refused the American-style secular learning, which led 
to rampant illiteracy amongst the Muslim population and a widened education 
gap between the Muslims and the Christians, who embraced the educational 
system and gained government positions within the Moro Province 
administration.94  
Scholars assert that the legacy of colonializion left the Moro population 
disenfranchised from the political system, exacerbating the educational, 
employment, and socio-economic disparity between them and their Christian 
counterparts.  As the country transitioned to an independent state in 1946, 
Muslims Filipinos protested against the inclusion of the Moroland in any 
independence talks.  Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the American 
government, stating “we do not want to be included in the Philippines 
Independence.  For once independence is launched, there will be trouble 
between us and the Christian Filipinos because from the time immemorial these 
two peoples have not lived harmoniously…It is not proper [for two antagonistic] 
peoples [to] live together under one flag.”95  The United States rejected their 
statement, and for the Moros, they felt they were effectively colonized again; this 
time by Christian Filipinos.  The new government in Manila continued the policies 
and institutions of displacement and subjugation.  Moro homeland, traditions, and 
opportunities were in jeopardy again, and again it was time to take up arms; this 
time not for the preservation of Moro cultures and traditions within the state, but 
for a new goal: succession.       
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The influx of Christian Filipinos and encouragement from the state 
inflamed Moro hostilities.  Muslims, now a minority, had to compete with 
immigrant Christians over land, economic resources, and political power within 
their traditional ancestral territories.  Moros continued their resistance of Manila's 
rule, and throughout the 1970s, widespread violence targeting ethnicity and 
religion subsumed much of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.96  Amidst this 
ethno-religious strife, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law 
in 1972, citing rampant violence as the main cause of his decision.  According to 
Daniel Joseph Ringuet, the oppressiveness of martial law and the Marcos regime 
made Muslims realize their own situation; the Moros demanded recognition from 
Manila as a distinctive ethno-religious group.97  As a response to political and 
economic neglect from Christian leaders and perceived anti-Muslim policies from 
Manila, three major separatist organizations emerged: the Moro Nationalist 
Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Abu Sayyaf Group.     
The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was created to seek out 
complete liberation of the Moroland from the Philippines state.  Founder Nur 
Misuari believed in Moro self-determination and independence through armed 
revolt.98  According to the MNLF, martial law threatened the Muslim way of life.  
The organization lead a jihad against Marcos regime and engaged the AFP in 
many bloody battles; at the height of violence between 1973-1975, an estimated 
50,000 military and civilians were killed.99 
In 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) emerged as a new 
separatist group, stemming from a political rift between MNFL leaders Misuari 
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and Hashim Salamat, who accused Misuari of corruption and abuse of power.100  
Where the two rival organizations differed was in the desired political end-state: 
the MNLF pushed for the creation of a separate Moro state from the Philippine 
government (ethnic nationalist identity), while the MILF sought to establish a 
separate Islamic Moro state (ethnic Muslim identity).101  Salamat declared: “We 
want an Islamic political system and way of life and can be achieved through 
effective Da’wah, Tarbiyyah, and Jihad.”102   
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) may be the smallest separatist 
organization, with only a few hundred members, but is considered the most 
radical and violent.  Since the group split from the MNLF in 1992, Ringuet 
claimed that the ASG believes it is continuing the 300-years long tradition of 
armed Muslim opposition against Christians.103  Its founder, Aburajak Janjalani, 
declared that the organization’s goal was establishing an independent Islamic 
state in Mindanao.104  Because the group engages in kidnappings for ransom, 
bombings, assassinations, and extortion, many, including Moros themselves, 
contend that the ASG is just a band of rogue thugs and extreme bandits looking 
for a quick profit and have no real ideology.     
Each Philippine president addressed the Moro separatist issue differently.  
The first attempt at reconciliation between the MNLF and Manila after years of 
intense fighting came under the Tripoli accord.  Under the auspices of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Marcos administration met 
with MNLF leadership in Tripoli.  The signed agreement on 23 December 1976 
granted autonomy to the Muslim-dominated areas in the south, while foreign 
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policy, national defense, and resource management remained under Manila’s 
jurisdiction.  Moros could establish shariah laws, their own administrative, 
economic, and financial systems, and Special Regional Security Forces.105  
However, the Tripoli agreement failed.  Some believe that both sides could not 
agree over means of implementation.  Others blamed President Marcos’s lack of 
commitment, noting that he used Tripoli to defuse armed conflict and weaken the 
MNFL.106  Since the agreement was never implemented, fighting resumed 
between the AFP and rebel soldiers.  Yet despite this failure, Tripoli provided the 
benchmark for future negotiations between the central government and 
separatist groups. 
Corazon Aquino’s People Power movement against the Marcos 
administration found support in the Moro groups, who staunchly advocated 
regime change.107  With her election, a new era of cooperation and negotiation 
emerged.  In efforts to resolve conflict with the separatists, President Aquino 
proposed the creation of the “Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao” (ARMM).  
But only two Mindanao provinces (Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur) and two 
Sulu provinces (Sulu and Tawitawi) approved this proposal; and on 6 November 
1990, the fragmented four-province ARMM was inaugurated, granting Muslims in 
the region control over some aspects of government, but not to include national 
security and foreign affairs.108  The ARMM was not initially considered a 
success.  First, only four provinces accepted the autonomous region.  Secondly, 
the MNLF had abandoned negotiations after disputing the territorial basis of the 
ARMM.  Lastly, rebels violated the cease-fire agreements. 
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President Fidel Ramos and his administration tried to restore MNLF 
confidence in the central government and offered a new peace settlement.  The 
1996 Agreement, signed on 2 September, emphasized peace and development 
in southern Philippines.  It called for the establishment of the Southern 
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and ARMM, 
representation in institutions of national government, creation of Special Regional 
Security Forces, inclusion of Islamic curriculum in education system, and 
authority of shariah court.  Moreover, MNLF founder Nur Misuari was placed as 
governor of ARMM.  This agreement ended not only the MNLF issue for Manila, 
but also two decades of conflict.  However, problems still remained.  The 1996 
agreement had little support from the other Moro separatist groups.  Both the 
MILF and ASG continued their armed struggle against the central government.  
Additionally, many Moros felt a lack of strong commitment and resources from 
Manila.  The agreement like all the other attempts at peace did not improve the 
living standards of Muslim Filipinos; poverty rates were still high, infrastructure 
development was slow, and investments low.109  Lastly, Misuari and other 
SPCPD officials were accused of mismanagement and corruption, lending little 
faith in the ARMM structure from the masses. 
2. Manila and the Communist Rebels 
The Huks were the forefathers of the current communist insurgents in the 
Philippines.  Upon the rebellion’s defeat in the early 1950s, the remaining 
members, along with young Marxist-Leninists and Maoist revolutionaries, joined 
the CPP and its guerrilla army, the NPA, formed December 1968 in central Luzon 
and lead by Jose Marie Sison.  While first espousing political struggles over 
military warfare, the CPP began to turn more towards militancy and guerilla 
tactics as the means of revolution against the government and military.110 
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Martial law and governmental crackdowns under President Marcos could 
not stop the steady growth of the CPP and the NPA; discontent of Manila fueled 
popular support and membership for the communist movement.  The government 
sanctioned major military anti-insurgency operations, and arrested and killed 
many rebels, including high level CPP and NPA officials.  However, 
intensification of CI campaigns coupled with in anti-communism and military aid 
from Washington could not defeat the insurgencies; despite his attempts, the 
communist movement flourished under President Marcos.  At the end of his 
regime, there were approximately 22,500 NPA soldiers, with nearly twenty 
percent of the country’s villages under communist influence.111      
Ironically, President Aquino’s rise to power hurt the communist movement.  
First, President Marcos’s extreme unpopularity was a major CPP recruiting tool.  
Second, many cadre members sought open political participation in the new 
government.  One of President Aquino’s aims was to win over the communists 
with “economic progress and justice…for which the best intentioned among them 
fight.”112  She released political detainees, including CPP Chairman Sison, and 
agreed to a sixty-day cease-fire.  At first, the CPP adopted conciliatory polices 
and collaboration with the government.113  However, in February 1987, the NPA 
picked up arms against the AFP again after a break in cease-fire agreement.  
Following suit, the CPP executive committee recommitted itself to a protracted 
people's armed struggle against the government.   
This time, the movement was not as successful in carrying out its 
revolution as the rebels were during the Marcos years; the popular support, 
recruitment, and financial base had waned.  One explanation of this was the 
popularity of the president, thus no longer lending itself to an ideological 
recruitment tool.  Secondly, the government revised its CI strategy.  Campaigns 
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under President Marcos involved food blockades, search operations, and 
hamletting to flush out rebels, but often alienated the population and roused 
CPP-NPA support.  Despite changes to counter-insurgency, the conventional 
military force utilized the same tactics as before.  Thus, modifications to the CI 
strategy included deployment of special operations and improved military 
intelligence.  This resulted in the capturing of top level party members and NPA 
leaders.  These repeated arrests prompted the CPP to suspect each other of 
treason and conduct purges within the party ranks.  Moreover, the military 
successfully conducted psychological operations against the communist rebels, 
including exposing mass graves of purged members.114   
A third explanation of why the communists were less successful under 
President Aquino’s administration was her restoration of democratic values and 
institutions, which significantly impeded the revolutionary fervor.  In 1987, Peace 
and Order Councils were established to promote civilian cooperation at all levels 
of government with traditional military operations.  However, despite a change in 
the political aspect, the CI campaign remained largely a military endeavor.  By 
the early 1990s, communist strength had declined.  The government estimated 
that insurgent numbers fell 18,000 rebels, although the AFP contended that there 
were still about 30,000 CPP members.115 
The challenges posed by insurgency groups throughout Philippine history, 
most acutely in the past three decades, have shaped each president’s approach 
to counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, which have been predominantly 
military campaigns with injected assistance from the United States.  As the new 
millennium ushers in a new international focus on terrorism, Manila continues to 
face threats from the MILF, ASG, and the CPP-NPA, as well as exposes itself to 
an international terrorist presence.   
 
 




B. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 9/11 
While internal insurgencies and terror acts have always been a source of 
contention, international terrorism has also been elevated as a domestic concern 
within the Philippines.  In recent years, Muslim separatist organizations have 
been linked to such transactional terrorist groups as Al-Qaeda and JI, both 
known to operate in the porous southern region.  Now as a partner nation in the 
coalition against terrorism, the Philippines has garnered international support to 
combat this problem.  President Arroyo stated that her country “stands together 
with the United States and the community of nations in a common effort to 
contain and to destroy terrorists and their global networks.”116  She was not only 
one of the first world leaders to condemn the 9/11 actions and to join the 
international coalition against terrorism; she was the first in Asia.  Moreover, 
unlike much of the other ASEAN leaders, she openly supported the US-led War 
in Iraq, pledging a 175-member humanitarian mission to Iraq.117  Additionally, 
she offered Philippine airspace and seaports, including former US bases Clark 
Airbase and Subic Bay, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and 
logistical support. 
New policy and legislation were proposed and enacted as a result of 9/11 
and terrorism as an international imperative.  Almost immediately, President 
Arroyo announced her policy and action approach to combating terrorism through 
“14 pillars of policy and action against terrorism” (see Appendix B for an outline 
of each point).  Per Francisco L. Tolin, retired AFP officer and vice-president for 
Research and Special Studies at the National Defense College of the Philippines, 
this national framework was aimed at strengthening internal anti- and counter-
terrorism efforts through delineation of responsibilities, modernization of the 
military and police force, anticipation and preparation for future attacks, enlisting 
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the cooperation of other sectors in the society such as the media, and addressing 
the varied underpinnings of terrorism.118   
Legislatively, with presidential approval, Congress passed the Anti-Money 
Laundering Act on 29 September 2001, which froze financial assets of (alleged) 
international terrorists as well as targeted the flow of illegal monies from criminal 
activities.119  This act was the country’s first-ever law to criminalize money 
laundering, meeting the deadline (by one day) and avoiding potentially disruptive 
sanctions by the international financial community.  In addition, President Arroyo 
ordered the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of the 
Interior and Local Government to identify and neutralize "dubious personalities 
and organizations" that may be operating as fronts for terrorist and criminal 
activities.120   
In November 2002, Manila hosted the International Conference on Anti-
Terrorism and Tourism Recovery, in which 18 countries including ASEAN 
countries, China, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
passed a resolution for information sharing and security cooperation among 
themselves and the tourism industry.121  The government has also stepped up 
law enforcement and intelligence-gathering activities; improvements to the 
immigration system included implementation of computerized immigration checks 
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at international airports.122  Moreover, Manila assures the international 
community 24-hour surveillance of sea and airports.123 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the administration created the Inter-Agency 
Task Force Against International Terrorism.124  With Defense Secretary Eduardo 
Ermita at the helm, this Task Force coordinates intelligence operations with other 
coalition allies, and identifies and neutralizes suspected terrorist cells in the 
Philippines.125  In addition, the president also expelled three Iraqi diplomats per 
Washington’s request of coalition allies.126  Manila attests that the task force has 
been hard at work at CT efforts.  Recent reports have arisen that a handful of 
foreign JI members are under surveillance in the Philippines.  Of this, the 
president stated that “we are closely watching foreigners in the country who may 
have taught [Abu Sayyaf] to make bombs, and who may have laundered money 
for the Al-Qaeda and the JI into the pockets of local bombers.”127  Six suspected 
members of ASG were arrested and thus their terrorist plans thwarted, per recent 
accounts.  Moreover, President Arroyo contended that a “Madrid-level” attack 
was prevented with arrest of four Al-Qaeda-linked extremists and the seizure of 
an 80-pound explosive cache intended for shopping malls and trains bombings 
throughout Manila.  Among those arrested was a man who claimed the 
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Superferry 14 explosion in Manila last 27 February, where over 100 were either 
killed or still missing.128 
Turning to the economy, President Arroyo clearly believes in the linkage 
between war on terrorism with war on poverty: “I see that the world needs to fight 
poverty as the highest of all priorities because it breeds division and conflict and 
terrorism…There is no denying that poverty provides the breeding grounds for 
the recruitment of terrorists.”  Her administration has put economic recovery at 
the top of the priority list.  She lobbied that the developing world needs access to 
the West’s markets, currently obstructed by agricultural subsidies.129  She has 
sought to increase more open trade relations with the United States, seeking 
duty-free privileges for Philippine products such as dried mangos and tuna.130  
She also encourages much needed foreign investment into the Philippines; by 
actively combating terrorism, the risk to investors will decrease and allow new 
possibilities of funds flow into the country.131  Moreover, with her support and 
allegiance to the United States in the war on Iraq, she hopes the economy, 
Philippine businesses, and Filipino workers can gain from the overseas 
rebuilding projects.  The president signed Executive Order 194 on 14 April 2003, 
creating the Public-Private Sector Task Force for the Reconstruction of Iraq, 
which would coordinate manpower and rebuilding efforts in public works, 
telecommunications, health services, and law enforcement.  These economy-
focused efforts are attempting to boost employment and poverty levels as part of 
the country’s overall CT plan.    
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President Arroyo is also committed to peace and stability in the southern 
Philippines, amidst three decades of hostilities.  While past administrations 
opened up dialogues with the MNLF, hers is engaged in peace and autonomy 
negotiations with the MILF.  Third-party Malaysia, a member of the OIC, has 
agreed to help mediate the dialogue.132  The MILF demands independence 
modeled after the “East Timor” resolution, coupled with economic rehabilitation 
programs, while the Philippine government is pursuing negotiated regional 
autonomy.133  Despite on-going talks and cease-fire agreements, the southern 
Philippines is still plagued with violence and hostilities.  The MILF accuses the 
AFP of derailing the peace process.   The AFP cites Muslim rebels with cease-
fire violations and terror tactics.  Moreover, rumors surround the separatist 
organization that there is dissention among the ranks over settlements with the 
central government.  While many Muslims can comprise with autonomy, factions 
within the MILF believe that independence is the only solution.  As of this paper, 
negotiations are on-going. 
C. MILITARY RESPONSE TO 9/11 
Along with a comprehensive response by the government, the Philippine 
armed forces were quick to support the war on terrorism.  The military had two 
main security goals in mind with the onset of the GWOT.  First, the AFP wanted 
to restore close military-to-military ties with the United States weakened by the 
base closures.  Second, it needed to enhance CT capabilities.  The Philippines 
has recommitted itself to the 1952 MDT, declaring full support of 
American/Coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, offering intelligence, 
airspace, military bases, and ground forces, in exchange for military hardware 
and supplies under the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA).134   
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Another CT response by the military as well as law enforcement includes 
the creation of both the Joint Task Force within the AFP and the AFP-PNP Joint 
Task Forces in Mindanao.  The AFP Joint Task Force, composed of special units 
from the different branches of service, promotes the application of the joint 
concept of operations, and command and control.  The AFP-PNP Joint Task 
Force stemmed from General Order Number 2, in order to enhance joint 
capabilities through working together towards preventing, suppressing, and 
neutralizing terrorist acts and lawless violence in Mindanao.135   
The AFP has historically been the primary organization in charge of 
conducting anti- and counter-terrorism and -insurgency operations.  As fighting 
intensified over the recent years, the military believes that their organization is 
under-staffed and ill-equipped to defeat thousands of rebels from different groups 
and understaffed rebels.  Thus President Arroyo and the AFP petitioned 
Congress to increase the size of army (currently around 68,000), by an additional 
20,000 troops.136   
According to Patricia Paez, a spokeswoman at the Philippine Embassy in 
Washington, President Arroyo was looking for “an expansion in US military 
assistance in terms of equipment, training and advisers.  The US forces will not 
play any combat role, but they will help us in routing out the terrorists 
ourselves.”137  Balikatan 02-1 was the largest joint and combined military 
exercise between Philippine and America forces.  According to Tolin, the four 
main objectives of Balikatan 02-1 were: to improve the CT interoperability of 
Philippine and America forces; to enhance the combat capability of AFP infantry 
battalions based in Mindanao; to ensure quality in intelligence processing; and to 
upgrade Philippine-US capability to wage effective civil, military and 
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psychological operations.138  Although Balikatan 02-1 was (considered by many) 
a success, talks for future joint exercises, including the next iteration 03-1 in the 
Sulu archipelago, have stalled.  Both sides at this juncture cannot agree to terms 
of engagement.  Additionally, Manila feels that any more large-scale operations 
may jeopardize the on-going delicate peace negotiations with the MILF in 
Mindanao. 
D. CRITICISMS TO PHIILIPPINE 9/11 RESPONSE 
Although seemingly a robust response to 9/11, the Philippine government 
and military have been under heavy criticism as to their actions – as well as lack 
of – in the war on terrorism.  Some experts contend that the situation in the 
Philippines has not changed in the new security environment; Manila is still 
battling the same insurgent and terrorist groups as it had decades before.  Thus 
“globalizing” this terrorist issue has not changed the internal threats and 
responses from the Philippine government and military.   
Furthermore, other critics claim that nothing substantial has been 
accomplished in the form of true CT policy reform.  The current administration 
lacks the political will and conjecture to take anything more than a superficial 
show of support to the United States and the GWOT coalition partners.  The 
recent crackdown on terrorism, some assert, is really President Arroyo projecting 
a tough image.139  The government’s efforts at politically affecting the CT 
campaign are weak.  The Anti-Money Laundering Act had little effectiveness for 
curbing the use of Filipino financial institutions by supposed terrorist 
organization.140  The Anti-Terrorism Bill, which provides a legal basis to address 
terrorism, has been deliberate in Congress for some time now; critics clamor that 
some politicians are attempting to stall legislation.  This bill, however, has also 
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been a source of controversy within Philippine society, much like the Patriot Act 
in the United States.  Moreover, many point out that the true and much-needed 
CT reform and legislation has not yet been passed; the ones that address the 
prosecution of convicted terrorists and the consequences of graft and corruption 
within the system.  Thus the Philippine government has dome very little to affect 
CT policy within the country. 
Political opponents of the Arroyo administration claim that GWOT 
responses are in effect guises to promote other interests.  Some leftist groups 
claim that the government “is colluding with the US government and using the 
anti-terrorist hysteria to underhandedly justify the heightened US military 
presence in the Philippines,”141 warning that current responses could leave the 
country open to future retaliation.   The Moro community has also criticized the 
administration’s response.  Although President Arroyo has previously stated that 
the government’s anti-terrorism drive “will continue to be carried out without any 
ethnic or religious bias, and with only the enforcement of impartial justice in 
mind.”142  Some Muslim critics claim that the CT campaign has a suspiciously 
anti-Islam bias, and that this is an opportunity for Manila to continue its crusade. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Since its independence, the Philippines has faced insurgencies and 
terrorist acts against the state, predominantly from Moro separatist groups and 
communist guerilla fighters.  And in recent decades, the once domestic struggle 
has been infused with outside influences and challenges, mostly notably from Al-
Qaeda and JI.  Manila’s responses to terrorism and insurgencies have changed 
throughout its history, from traditional military CI/CT operations, to changes in the 
political system such as martial law, to cooption of or peaceful negotiations with 
insurgent groups.  However, aside from the 1996 agreement with the MNLF, 
Manila has not yet produces an effective CT/CI plan to eradicate these insurgent 
and terrorist forces within the borders.  President Arroyo has attempted to 
                                            
141 Ibid, p. 203 
142 Marichu Villanueva and Christina Mendez.  “Anti-Terror Task Force Keeps Watch on 
Foreigners in RP.”  Philippine Headline News Online.  8 April 2004.  
(http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/hl/hl100199.htm accessed May 2004). 
47 
strengthen the government’s response through policy and legislative changes as 
well as international cooperation with GWOT and ASEAN partners.  Although 
more emphasis has been placed on the recent political and legal aspects of the 
overall GWOT campaign, the AFP still remains the primary CT/CI force.  Critics 
claim that the military itself has its own agenda separate from and sometimes in 
conflict with Manila.  Furthermore, they contend that Manila lacks the political will 
and resources to effectively counter terrorism.  Thus if history is any indication of 
the resolve and capabilities of the government and military, the Philippines has 
not yet proved itself to be decisively capable of eradicating terrorism.  But there is 
another angle to the Philippine CT story, one that looks inside the system to 
reveal that ending terrorism, insurgency, and overall conflict are in fact not the 
end goal: securing and continuing US political and financial support under the 
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III. PROFITING FROM CONFLICT AND WAR ON TERRORISM 
The 9/11 response from the Philippines has been recognized and 
rewarded.  In order to enhance the country’s CT capabilities, Washington has 
provided political support to Manila, allocating hundreds of millions of dollars in 
military and economic aid.  However, one argument contends that current 
support levels are not contributing to the eradication of terrorism; instead, US 
policy provides an incentive structure in which actors and units within the 
government, military, and even insurgent groups perpetuate conflict at a low level 
to ensure the continuation of political and financial benefits.  Let us revisit Figure 
3; actors are profiting from the war on terrorism and thus create and sustain a 
presence of conflict and terrorism in order to continue to reap these political and 
economic gains from US policy and the GWOT. 
 
Figure 3.    Ideal and Proposed Effect of US GWOT Policy on Philippine Terrorism 
and Insurgency Levels 
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This chapter will explore this hypothesis by describing the factors 
contributing to the intervening variables and alternate outcome, per the proposed 
path in Figure 3.  To reiterate the causal relationship, the introduction of the IV 
(instead of raising CT capabilities in order to defeat terrorism) leads to individuals 
and/or units in the Philippines finding utility in and profit from US GWOT policy.  
They perpetuated or allow a minimum level of conflict and terrorism in order to 
secure future benefits of the policy components.  As a result, these actors within 
this incentive structure continue to profit from the war on terror and US policy, 
and thus the intended outcome of decreased levels or even the eradication of 
terrorism is never achieved.  In its place is continued conflict in order to initiate 
the incentive cycle once more. 
This argument exploration seeks to answer the following questions.  Who 
within the Philippine government, military, and insurgency groups is profiting from 
US policy and the war on terrorism?  Secondly, how are they profiting?  Lastly, 
how are these actors perpetuating conflict in order to continue profiting from 
policy?  Three key groups will be examined: the Philippine government, the AFP, 
and the insurgencies groups, particularly the subgroups MILF, ASG, and 
CPP/NPA. 
 
A. POLITICS AS USUAL…AND THEN SOME 
Local to state actors and institutions can find utility at various levels from 
outside support in on-going conflicts.  The most immediate outcome in supporting 
the US-led war on terrorism is closer political relations with Washington and 
significant increases in aid.  However, corruption on all levels is an unfortunate 
and unintended by-product of foreign aid: political profiting to secure power, set 
the national agenda, and serve personal interest; and economic profiting to 
extract resources (money, supplies, etc.) for personal gains.     
One benefit from the GWOT is US recognition and commitment to help 
Manila with its internal terrorist and insurgent.  According to some scholars, the 
Arroyo administration saw the GWOT as an opportunity to finally settle the Moro 
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separatist issue.  The president “internationalized” this domestic problem and 
secured Washington’s support and partnership.143  The government including the 
AFP did not have the CT/CI capacity to eradicate insurgencies without 
augmented support and increased aid from the United States.  Additionally, 
within this global framework, the MILF may face international pressure to 
negotiate peace with Manila. 
The war on terrorism can produce another unintended benefit; political 
leaders can use war or warlike conditions to legitimize more extreme policies and 
tighter control over the country in order to combat a national enemy – 
terrorists.144  This tactic to justify increased authority was most evident during the 
Marcos administration and his imposition of martial law to mitigate lawlessness 
and violence from leftists, communists, and separatists.  Cracking down terrorist 
cells within society can explain Manila’s stronger authority over governmental 
institutions as well as the population.   Individual traditional politicians, also 
known as TRAPOS, can politically profit from the GWOT by consolidating their 
power and promote their interests and agendas; incidentally they can also 
economically profit through more opportunities to extract from the economy.   
Increases in US foreign assistance can also lead to an extensive 
competition for resources from various governmental bureaucracies and 
agencies.  The agencies directly tied into the war on terrorism will most likely 
receive the aid.  Thus, by demonstrating a concerted need, through for example 
failed operations or other inefficiencies in countering terrorism, officials within the 
ranks of the government can secure added resources and funds.   
Despite commitment to the GWOT, not everyone in the Philippines wants 
to see the system or the situation change.  Some political analysts claim that the 
selected group of Filipino families, ala dynasties with socio-economic and 
political influence, has vested interest in maintaining the status quo, which may 
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include some level of conflict.145 Under the current condition, this oligarchy 
controls over key industries and political posts both in Manila and throughout the 
archipelago, and have learned to manipulate or even orchestrate the situation on 
the ground.  Reports have exposed that many of these elites maintain their own 
private mini-army and participate in extrajudicial activities of further their political, 
economic, and personal interests.  Any public or mandated changes can disrupt 
their networks of control and profit. 
Lastly, by maintaining a certain amount of conflict and terrorism within the 
Philippines, the government can secure on-going levels of foreign aid and CT 
assistance.  The Philippines is not the only Asian country receiving such support; 
in recent years, Indonesia has been the nearest Southeast Asian competitor for 
US assistance and GWOT partnership.  In the 2004 CRS report on foreign aid 
programs, Indonesia was recognized as a key partner in the GWOT, without a 
mention of the Philippines.  Moreover, the country is listed as one of the top US 
aid recipients in the world; It is in fact the highest recipient of US aid in 
East/Southeast Asia (not to include South and Southwest Asia).146  Thus, the 
Philippines has to sustain a perpetual level of need for CT support, lest aid 
amounts decrease in favor of other Asian countries and programs.    
Instead of decreasing levels of conflict and violence and combating 
terrorism within the Philippines, these unintended benefits from the war against 
terror, increased political support and military and economic aid have provided a 
cyclical incentive structure for certain political actors to perpetuate conflict in 
order to further extract profit and utility from the GWOT.  How do these actors 
and/or units create and maintain the presence of conflict and terrorism? 
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One effective tool to maintain the presence of conflict and terrorism is 
change the notion of terrorism to best suit their interest or advantage.147  
TRAPOS and other government officials can play this semantics game to best 
suit their interests, by either escalating traditional criminal acts to the magnitude 
of international terrorism, or the opposite, ignoring a terror act and deeming it a 
traditional crime.  Some pundits use the example of the Superferry 14 explosion 
in February 2004 to illustrate this point of semantically altering the notion of 
terrorism.  When a bomb was detonated on this commuter ferry, law enforcement 
did not initially classified this incident as a terrorist act, as some speculate, out of 
fear of further tarnishing the Arroyo administration’s much criticized CT program.  
It was not until the confession of “passenger 51,” an ASG extremist, who claimed 
to have planted TNT onboard the ferry, did police and CT units consider this to 
possibly be terrorism.  The alternate example also exists.  Consider this 
motivation: a month after the Superferry 14 explosion, President Arroyo was 
quick to announce that the inter-agency CT task force had thwarted a “Madrid-
level” bombing attack on Manila’s malls and trains.  Some critics cite that this 
statement was a sort of public demonstration to the United States and the GWOT 
coalition of a success case in intelligence gathering and CT operations, in order 
to prove that the Philippines can be an effective GWOT partner.  By showing 
some level of success amidst conflict, the government can attest that aid and 
support is indeed going towards the countering terrorism, but more is needed to 
increase the campaign’s effectiveness.          
Another method is to play upon the lack of overall political will and 
commitment to eradicate terrorism, despite public support for the GWOT.  Some 
experts and analysts contend that TRAPOS, including local power brokers and 
Christian politicians in the south, have stalled on reform bills and measures in 
order to preserve the political status quo.148  Critics have also claimed that CT 
legislation is weak and does not root out the causes of terrorism.  Despite the 
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occasional high profile arrests of convicted terrorists and intelligence sharing, 
political forces within the Philippine government benefit from sustained levels of 
conflict and the existing state of affairs. 
B. WAR ON TERRORISM AS A LUCRATIVE BUSINESS FOR THE AFP 
The Philippines’ role in GWOT has forged closer military-to-military 
relations with the United States.  With these ties came increased levels of military 
aid and equipment, coupled with much need training, to combat terror and 
insurgent groups.  The AFP has been injected with new tools and methods to 
counter terrorism.  However, some argue that while the military is seemingly on 
the forefront of the country’s CT campaign, the organization is also profiting from 
this war and US policy.    
Although the military has been fighting insurgent forces for decades, the 
GWOT has elevated the status of the AFP as country’s premier CT/CI force.  
With this important role, the military can further secure its political power and 
influence.  The military is in it of itself a powerful political entity; top leaders have 
hand influenced the government and the system.  The AFP, along with the 
Catholic Church, was pivotal in the ousting of President Marcos in 1986 and 
garnering mass support of his successor, Cory Aquino.  In addition, the AFP can 
seek to boost budget and manpower.  Not only did President Arroyo request from 
Congress added funding for more military personnel, but the national defense 
budget increased.  For 2004 alone, the House Appropriation committee 
expanded the defense budget by 2.5 billion pesos (almost $45 million) from last 
year, totaling 45.171 billion pesos ($809 million).149  This included salary and 
benefit hikes for Filipino servicemembers.  Individual soldiers can also benefit 
from wartime actions and secure operational accomplishments, recognition, and 
promotions. 
With this elevated role, the AFP can find added opportunities to extract 
and profit from the war on terrorism.  In an op-ed article in the New York Times, 
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Brett M. Decker pointed to the rampant corruption within the military, claiming 
that a substantial amount of the defense budget is lost to graft.  He wrote that in 
August 2003, the chief of the armed forces, General Narciso Abaya, admitted 
“there is graft and corruption at all levels.”  Moreover, US military aid and 
equipment are also “siphoned away” due to internal corruption: 
Testimony before the Philippine Congress in the past several 
months revealed that American M-16's provided to the Philippine 
armed forces have been recovered in camps belonging to Abu 
Sayyaf, a band of guerrillas and kidnappers. Assault rifles, grenade 
launchers and other American arms have been used by Muslim 
radicals against Philippine troops -- the very troops United States 
funds are supposed to assist.150 
The selling government-issued firearms and supplies either on the black 
market or to insurgent organizations is a common practice, another opportunity to 
profit from the GWOT.  Individual soldiers can subsidize their wages through 
income generated from equipment sales.  Alarmingly, Muslim rebels have 
confessed to purchasing weapons from military.  Representative Benasing 
Macarambon, Congressman for Lanao del Sur and former MNLF commander, 
has asserted that the sale of military weapons and supplies to Moro rebels been 
going on since 1970s:  “I’ve been a rebel myself and we got most of our 
equipment from the military.  Of course, not directly with the government but 
there were military personnel selling to us.  That’s my experiences and the 
experience today.”151  It is not just firearms sold; when the military tracked down 
ASG leader Aldam Tilao in 2002, he carried night vision goggles supplied to the 
AFP by the United States.152  Consequently, the individuals selling their weapons 
and ammunition to the rebels did not remove serial numbers.  As a result, recent 
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raids of MILF bases have exposed weapons with AFP markings.153  Although 
large caches of military arms and supplies have turned up in rebel camps, to the 
MILF spokesperson, Eid Kabalu, was “sure there was no collusion” between the 
Moro separatists and the government, claiming that it is mostly likely that only 
individual soldiers were selling their equipment; weapons are “a prime 
commodity, very much in demand” in the southern Philippines.154  In addition, 
upon these various raids and round-ups, the AFP can confiscate rebel arsenals 
and keep firearms, ammunition, and supplies for future resale for personal profit.  
The culmination of this claim that the AFP perpetuates conflict in order to 
justify increases in the national budget and US aid came with the mutiny attempt 
by 300 renegade soldiers, led by 70 junior officers, on 27 July 2003 in the 
Oakwood luxury apartments in Manila’s large Glorietta Mall.  Motivated by low 
pay and rampant corruption in the military, these “Oakwood mutineers” 
demanded the resignation of President Arroyo and top military official for 
unfettered graft within the AFP, including the selling of weapons to MILF, NPA, 
and ASG to prolong rebellion and extract more aid from the United States.155  
Although the coup attempt ended with peaceful surrender after tense day-long 
standoff, it proved to be an embarrassment for the Philippine government and 
military, as another perennial salting of the wound of alleged corruption endemic 
in the system. 
If the AFP and individual servicemembers want to continue profiting from 
the incentive cycle generated by the GWOT and US support, how do they 
maintain a presence of terror and conflict within the archipelago?  What are 
possible tactics?  One such tactic is catch-and-release, whereby the military and 
police capture insurgents and then “allow” them to escape from prison.  This 
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tactic can reap multiple benefits.  Military and police personnel can either 
demand or accept bribes from the rebel organizations to “allow” the prisoners to 
escape, either by feigning incompetence and letting them walk out of prison or by 
staging a large-scale breakout.  Bribes are an added source of personal income 
and can transcend all levels, from the person watching the prison cell to high-
ranking commanders.  As reported by James Hookway, some investigators 
believe that money was exchanged for the escape of convicted (high profile) JI 
terrorist Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, accompanied by two suspected ASG 
members.156  Moreover, both play upon incompetence and condoning prison 
escapes can be seen as a justification to strengthen military spending and 
assistance in order to bolster CT capabilities and stop further occurrences from 
happening.  Additionally, recapturing high level escapees can also secure 
operational victories and individual achievements and promotions.  Prison breaks 
can also provide a justification to hunt down and kill escapee rebels, 
circumventing the legal process. 
Another tactic to perpetuate conflict is producing surrenderees as small 
gestures of success in the CT program.  MILF military spokesman Kabalu 
claimed that the military manufactures rebel surrenderees for materiel or 
personal gains.  He contended that per different news sources, perennial 
surrenderee Danny Dalamba “alias Commander Tawantawan” has given himself 
up to authorities several times in the past and in multiple locations.  Kabalu 
declared that the government is being duped by AFP officers.157 
 The MILF also claims that the military is purposefully sabotaging peace 
negotiations.  “The country’s top military honchos are the ones trying to derail he 
peace negotiations.  While we are convinced that the president is sincere in her 
invitation to talk about peace, we also believe that what the military wants is war,” 
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stated Al Hadj Murad, vice chairman for military affairs of MILF.158  In an 
interview with Bangsamoro Islamic News Agency, Moro separatist Mohagher 
Iqbal asserted that “the MILF is now the favorite whipping boy of the military 
whenever killing, ambuscade, kidnapping or other crimes occur.”159  Kabalu has 
also accused the military of planting bomb-making evidence in a factory in Lanao 
del Sur allegedly belonging to the rebel organization.  MILF leaders contend that 
any combat between the rebels and the AFP have been sheer self defense and 
not breaking any cease-fire agreements; the military is searching for any excuse 
to launch offensives against Muslim territories in order to finish off the MILF.160       
The most debated and controversial tactic to continue conflict is to engage 
in terrorist acts.  Some claim that the AFP itself is the largest terrorist 
organization in the Philippines.  The Oakwood mutineers have accused top 
military officials of masterminding bombings in Mindanao, including the Davao 
airport bombing, and blaming Moro separatists in an effort to extract more CT aid 
and equipment from the United States.161  Others contend that the AFP, along 
with the PNP, encourages and even engages in kidnapping-for-ransom to flex 
their power and extort added profits. 
C. DO INSURGENTS ALSO PROFIT FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM? 
Despite the war against terrorism, insurgency groups can also find profit 
from on-going conflict.  Rebel organizations are much like traditional militaries in 
that they too can thrive during conflict.  War-like conditions give the members a 
sense of purpose and ideological recommitment, an opportunity to fight for their 
cause and beliefs, as well as some kind of “employment” as a “full-time” or 
“professional” insurgent.  Rebel groups can collect revolutionary taxes and other 
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resources from local populations as a price for protection.162  In short, financial 
gains can be made during war.  Moreover, on-going conflict can enhance 
recruitment through the appeal of struggle, or in the Moro case, jihad.  Ethno-
religious/nationalistic organizations can claim that their aims and ideology are 
under assault and can call on religious or ethnic bonds to rally support and 
recruitment.   
Well-organized groups, like the MILF, can also solidify their leadership of 
the community, for instance the entire Muslim population instead of a few of the 
Moro tribes, including Magindanaos of the Cotabato region, the Maranaos of the 
Lanao provinces.  Other insurgency groups may see benefits with a return to a 
central ideology, such as religion or ethno-nationalism.  Although espousing 
Islamic extremism and calls for jihad, the ASG lost their religious foundation with 
the death of their founder Ustadz Janjalani in 1998, and turned to more criminal 
activities, such as kidnapping-for-ransom.  However, analysts purport that ASG is 
electing to return to their religion basis, with the help and influenced of JI.163  
Additionally, some groups may choose to carry on conflict to show other 
(international) religious-based organizations that they are not the relegated 
ideological periphery, but in active combat in the name of a religious cause with 
repressive governments.  Through this aim, insurgency groups in conflict can 
garner international support and financing from other rebel or extremist 
organizations or regimes that support them. 
Lastly, of insurgent groups in the Philippines, the MILF may be seen as 
having the most to gain with continued conflict, but it also has the most to loose 
with peace.  The 1996 settlement between the MNLF and Manila is not readily 
accepted as a success for the Moro population.  The ARMM proved to be a cash 
cow for the MNLF leadership who mismanaged resources and governance of the 
Muslim region in Mindanao.  Thus, the MILF is weary of a settlement with the 
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central government.  Peace can lead to another failed resolution; conflict can 
further impact negotiations in their favor.  The MILF may have a bigger 
bargaining chip with sustained violence, pressuring Manila to end conflict in the 
south by agreeing to their demands, independence (ideally) or more autonomous 
governance of the region (practically), along with socio-economic development 
assistance.  Moreover, the MILF can hold out for a larger financial carrot from the 
United States, which is currently pledging $30 million as an incentive for peace. 
With these benefits from the war on terrorism, how do insurgent groups 
perpetuate conflict?  First, they can play up the groups’ ideology and the 
populations’ struggles in order to increase recruitment and inspire jihad or the 
taking up of arms.  New recruits are encouraged to learn about jihad first hand 
through open combat or clandestine operations.164  Another tactic is to blame the 
military and government for perpetuating conflict.  The MILF has on several 
occasions accused the AFP of derailing the peace process and actively engaging 
in offenses against them.  Moreover, the MILF can break the cease-fire pacts in 
the name of self-defense drawing the military into combat.  An alternate tactic is 
to delay the peace negotiations with the Arroyo administration through finger-
pointing, resisting compromises, and stalling settlements. 
D. LOSERS IN THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURE: SOCIETY AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM   
While political, military, and insurgent actors continue to profit from the 
GWOT and US policy, the ultimate losers in this incentive cycle are the Philippine 
society and CT efforts to eradicate terrorism.  The Filipino population is caught in 
the middle of a war, a war over resources and benefits.  Meanwhile, the domestic 
economy is suffering greatly from a loss/lack of foreign investment due to 
investor concerns over continued conflict and terrorism.  Roughly 40% of the 
population is below the poverty line.165  Furthermore, the southern region in 
conflict, including Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, is the poorest in the 
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(already poverty-stricken) Philippines.  Foreign assistance programs, including 
that of USAID, are sustaining the southern economy.  Manila is not delivering on 
its promise of development in Mindanao; lack of governmental resources as well 
as perceived will are driving further disenfranchisement of the population with 
central government.  Analysts claim that Filipinos as a whole are pessimistic that 
Manila can rectify on-going problems of poverty- and conflict-alleviation, and thus 
turn to the United States to help solve domestic issues and provide much needed 
resources.166 
The Philippines must not overlook a key opportunity of the GWOT, 
enhancing their counter-terrorism capabilities, from political resolve to military 
endeavors.  The AFP needs America assistance and expertise in building up 
their CT programs.  However, the government and military must not become too 
dependent on the United States to provide CT training, planning, and resources.  
One of the main US GWOT goals is not only bolster Philippine anti- and counter-
terrorism capabilities, but also to promote self-sufficiency in their fight against 
terror.  Currently, the AFP is acting as an appendage to US forces, not as its own 
viable CT organization.  The current incentive cycle may be creating political and 
financial winners within the system, but it is also producing losers.  The Philippine 
population and counter-terrorism efforts are suffering at the hand of individual 
profit and opportunism.        
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on describing and analyzing the hypothesis that 
actors with the Philippine government, military, and insurgent groups can profit 
from the war on terror and US policy vis-à-vis a cyclical incentive structure that 
results in sustaining a presence of conflict and terrorism.  However, there are 
arguments to the contrary, that aside from minimal levels of self-interest and 
opportunism, actors and/or units are not profiting from the GWOT. International 
terrorism is not the only controversial topic for the government.  US military 
presence has led to some political and societal backlashes by nationalists and 
leftists who cite the Arroyo administration of allowing America imperialism in and 
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recolonialization of the country.  Moreover, the Philippine military is not benefiting 
from the GWOT.  Some feel that this is a US fight; the AFP has been dragged 
into an international battle it is not nearly prepared to wage, despite American 
support.  Lastly, some experts claim that insurgent groups have also not profited 
from the war on terror: the MILF organization and goals have been damaged; the 
US-Philippine Balikatan exercises all but dismantled the ASG.  Scholars ask that 
if 9/11 did not happen, would insurgent and terrorist groups would be stronger 
today?167 
Unfortunately, not enough empirical data and studies exists to fully 
analyze this hypothesis.  In my examination, I relied on academic, journalistic, 
and governmental literature, analysis, and personal expertise.  Further research 
on this topic is currently underway.  Moreover, the problem of graft and 
corruption within the Philippines is in some instances common-place and 
generally recognized and worked around; some even take a nonchalant 
approach to such opportunism as part of “doing business” or “getting things 
done”.   
In any case, international terrorism is a viable security threat for both the 
Philippines and the United States; combating terrorist networks are top on the 
priority list.  However, setbacks occur when actors and organizations within the 
Philippines seek profit from the GWOT and US policy, and ultimately the 
population and true counter-terrorism efforts lose.
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IV. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PHILIPPINE 
COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS AND US GWOT POLICY 
Is the Philippines profiting from the war on terrorism?  Yes, various 
political, military, and insurgent actors are, due to the cyclical incentive structure 
born out of current US policy as well as the GWOT itself.  President Arroyo and 
top officials can solidify their close relations with Washington, garnering future 
domestic and international political support.  TRAPOS, however, want to 
preserve the status quo and continue to benefit from their socio-politico-
economic positions, which could be enhanced by US aid policy.  The military can 
take this opportunity for forge stronger military-to-military ties with the United 
States, as well as benefiting from aid, equipment, and training.  Moreover, the 
AFP and other law enforcement agencies have an increased role in domestic 
count-terrorism and can claim a bigger piece of the national budget.  Lastly, 
insurgency groups can ironically find profit in the GWOT through ideological 
fervor, increased recruitment, and outside support from transnational 
organizations aimed at stamping out US presence and Manila’s repression.   
However cynical this proposal may appear to be, the resolution is not 
wholly pessimistic.  Although current profiting and opportunism persist, reforms 
within the system can terminate the cyclical incentive structure that perpetuates 
conflict and terrorism in order to continue benefiting from the present situation.  
Thus, if this argument, or at least some of its supposition, is true, both Manila and 
Washington can actively seek to change the unintended effects of the GWOT 
and US policy on Philippine CT efforts in order to achieve the desired end goal: 
the eradication of terrorism.  
Assuming that this argument is true, Manila and Washington must first 
recognize the existence of this cyclical profit system, and then actively pursue 
reforms to end corruption, opportunism, ineffective counter-terrorism measures, 
and sustained conflict.  When reformulating an effective and long-term CT 
campaign, Washington must remove the incentives to perpetuate conflict and 
terror by no longer making US policy and warlike conditions profitable for certain 
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actors and organization.  Meanwhile, Manila must take steps to end opportunities 
to profit within the system and situation.  Lastly, in order to effectively remove the 
cyclical incentive structure and achieved viable CT efforts within the Philippines, 
Manila and Washington together must be focus on the following key issues:  AFP 
and PNP professionalization and self-reliance, political will and governmental 
resources, commitment to peace and enfranchisement of the Muslim population, 
effective socio-economic development, and regional stabilization aside from a 
GWOT-paradigm. 
A. FOCUS ON AFP AND PNP PROFESSIONALISM AND SELF-
RELIANCE 
Both national defense and law enforcement organizations must be 
internally reformed.  Rampant accusations of inefficiency and corruption plague 
the reputations of the AFP and PNP.  In fact, it is not uncommon for 
servicemembers and police officers to use their positions for financial 
opportunism.  For instance, some men join the police force expecting bribes from 
citizens will augment their low salaries.  Equally, if not more, alarming is that a 
person can be employed as a policeman or soldier (by day), but take up arms in 
an insurgent group as a rebel (by night).  In the mid-1990s, under President 
Ramos, the military began a modernization program aimed at professionalizing 
the force and building up its CT campaign.  However, this program was short 
lived due to the Asian Financial Crisis which hurt the Philippine economy, leaving 
less funds to allocate to modernization, a change in presidency and shift in focus 
away from the program.168  After 9/11, many experts agree that the AFP is better 
off now than before, with improved training, equipment, and expertise by 
American forces.  Yet, these same experts maintain that there is still a huge 
differential between the threat on the ground and AFP capabilities.169   
The United States should encourage professionalism within the 
organizations and promote self-sufficiency in CT endeavors.  Soldiers and 
officers must continually conduct themselves in a professional manner and 
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uphold the law and defense of their country.  Moreover, the state must provide 
their professional forces with enough resource to sustain themselves and not 
have to turn to criminal or extrajudicial means to augment low salaries.  There 
needs to be mutual respect between the military and the government.     
The United States should continue to train the Philippine military and other 
CT organizations, and supply them not with new equipment but will lasting skills, 
such as operational tactics, strategies, and execution, as well as maintenance 
and repair.170  As the old adage goes, “if you give a man a fish, you feed him for 
a day; if you teach him how to fish, you feed him for a lifetime.”  Washington must 
encourage self-reliance and self-sufficiency over dependency – dependency on 
equipment, aid, and operations.  Manila has to recognize that high levels of US 
presence and support is not guaranteed forever, as evident in the lull of the 
1990s.  New priorities are shifting US attention away from the Philippines and 
into Iraq and neighboring Indonesia and Thailand.  The government and military 
must take the opportunity now to bolster their CT through current equipment and 
aid support, and training and expertise.  And Washington must realize that it 
cannot throw money and equipment at a problem, since that is not a recipe of a 
long-term solution and can create a negative incentive structure.  Instead, the 
right incentive blend is one that promotes professionalism, self-sufficiency, and 
self-reliance for Philippine military, police, and other CT agencies. 
B. FOCUS ON POLITICAL WILL AND GOVERNMENTAL RESOURCES   
Scholars and analysts point to Manila’s lack of resolve in cementing the 
notion of the Philippines as a cohesive nation, which in turn is reflected on 
society.  Informal networks dominate formal institutions; with a lack of national 
glue, the population turns to personal loyalties, family or social networks, and 
patron-cliental ties, instead of the government to satisfy their needs (unless they 
have personal relations within the governmental system, thus reverting back to 
networks and clientalism).171  In order for CT efforts to be effective for the long 
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run, Manila must have the political resolve as well as the resources to continue 
combating and eradicate terrorism and other lawlessness.  This should include 
institutional reforms to remove (opportunities for) graft and corruption.  
Legislation and policy must have teeth on them, both on the book and in 
implementation.  Law-breakers, whether they be civilian or military criminals, 
must be prosecuted accordingly, for any legislative action to warrant merit.  This 
includes the terrorist who detonates a bomb as well as the corrupt or co-opted 
policeman or soldier who “allows” him/her to escape from prison.  Otherwise, 
Manila will have yet another law or policy generally ignored by the population, 
leading to added pessimism of the system to combat terrorism.  
Moreover, political will must be backed by governmental resources.  
Experts assert that one reason why Manila lacks the necessary resolve is that it 
also lacks the necessary fund to carry out legislation, prosecution, reforms, and 
programs.  This lack of resources stems from the lack of capacity to efficiently tax 
the population.  Taxes are a country’s main source of income to finance 
governmental programs, including socio-economic development and national 
defense.  According to political analysts, a state needs to collect taxes from 
roughly 35% of the population in order to be viable.172  In the Philippine case, 
only about 17% is collected.  Moreover, the two main sources of revenue go 
mostly untaxed: the rich and the overseas workers.  In addition, these groups are 
not looking for the system to be reformed.  Thus, it will be politically difficult for 
Manila to extract taxes from the rich families, of which the dynastic oligarchies 
are included, many politicians and economic leaders belong.  However, a new 
program involving Philippine credit unions is currently being developed to tax 
incoming remittances from Filipino overseas workers, who supply a much-
needed injection of money into the economy.173  Many, including US analysts, 
hope that this program will be a success, both in collecting tax revenues and 
efficiently tracking overseas funds coming into the country.   
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C. COMMIT TO PEACE AND ENFRANCHISE THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY  
Both the Philippines and the United States should focus on the on-going 
peace talks between Manila and the MILF.  After strained attempts at a 
settlement and cease-fire breaks, Manila must show determination in peace 
negotiations, encouraging MILF leaders to return to the table.  Subsequently, the 
MILF, along with the Moro population, must also be remain firmly committed and 
not use scapegoats to back away from the peace process.  Although not directly 
involved, the United States must continue to support this endeavor, participating 
in an observer role and champion of peace.  Through the USIP and the State 
Department, Washington brings diplomatic support, political expertise, and 
financial assistance to the negotiating table.  Moreover, the successes of USAID 
programs in Mindanao should attest to US commitment to peace, development, 
and self-sufficiency of the (Muslim) region. 
Furthermore, both Manila and Washington must understand the MILF-
brand of Moro separatism, which is considered ideologically and tactically 
different from the ASG and other radical off-shoots.  According to Thomas 
McKenna, these Muslim rebels are not interested in nor connected to issues of 
the Arab world.  They fight for their own identity separate from the predominant 
Christian establishment.174  Other experts purport that secularism is the biggest 
threat to the Filipino Muslim identity.175  Thus, their ideological goals are not that 
of a pan-Islamic identity, but more a local, ethno-religious nationalism which 
embraces the creation of a Moro homeland, local control and governance, land 
reform, resource management, and self defense.  Moreover, the central 
government must realize that the template of past peace settlement is the 1996 
agreement with the MNLF, widely held as a failure by the Moro community.  
Manila should expect that the new negotiators have formulated their own 
“lessons learned” from the previous experiences.  
According to experts, one of the major failings of the 1996 agreement was 
the lack of governmental resources allocated to the ARMM.  Due to low tax 
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revenue for the state and the Asian Financial Crisis, Manila did not have enough 
finances to enact promised development programs, which further contributed to 
the discontent and frustration of the Muslim population.176  In order to fully 
commit to the lasting effects of any negotiated settlement, particularly one that 
leads to autonomy, Manila must be financially ready to assist the southern region 
in socio-economic rehabilitation.  With sever lack of state revenue, Manila may 
have to rely on and encourage outside investment and financial aid, especially 
from the United States, but should also look to (moderate) Muslim countries for 
economic and social support.  One such program with the makings of success is 
in (post-conflict) education.  Washington has earmarked funds for educational 
programs in Mindanao.  But this US assistance will only target secular education.  
In the past, secular education has been unsuccessful; the Muslim community 
saw this separation of education and religious studies as a ploy to disconnect 
them with their Islamic values and traditions.  A potential solution to this 
perception is to create a new education program, which incorporates Western 
(secular-style) schooling with separate religious education, augmented through 
investments made by other moderate Muslim countries.  The resulting model is 
similar to that of American students in public schools, who attend after-school or 
weekend religious education, separate from their daily studies.   
D. PROMOTE LASTING AND EFFECTIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT  
Along with encouraging peace and enfranchisement of the Muslim 
population, both Manila and Washington should be committed to lasting socio-
economic development of the entire archipelago, particularly the southern islands 
most wrought with poverty and underdevelopment.  In order to tailor effective 
programs, aid donors and dispersive organizations must analyze the type and 
level of assistance the community needs.  Many critics claim that certain state-
level development packages are not responsive to local requirements; instead, 
government-run programs select high-visibility projects such as major roadways, 
and less on specific infrastructure and economic programs targeting smaller 
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communities and localized needs.  Fortunately, USAID-sponsored socio-
economic development projects have received positive responses from southern 
communities, including the Muslim population.  USAID programs assess and 
target local requirements, and work closely with leaders and contractors within 
the communities, as well as ARMM officials and other NGOs in the region.177  
Moreover, certain programs, such as the Livelihood Enhancement and Peace 
(LEAP), are geared towards post-conflict rebuilding; LEAP reintegrates former 
rebels back into society by providing them skills such as farming and fishing and 
economic assistance.178  And through better taxation and increased collection, 
Manila can also contribute to its own socio-economic development programs, 
thus demonstrating political will and commitment to the enrichment of Philippine 
society and economy.  
Furthermore, all development programs, no matter where the funds 
originate, be it Manila or abroad, must build in an accountability mechanism, 
goals with milestones, and measurable successes as part of their requirements.  
Donors and recipients must be held responsible for the viability of the programs 
and their intended purposes.  Accountability and responsibility can also mitigate 
corruption allegations and attempts, as well as opportunism from aid.  Moreover, 
programs should also include ramifications if milestones, accountability, and 
other defined requirements are not met.  This will promote transparency, 
responsibility, and personal/communal ownership of these socio-economic 
development projects in order to maintain and encourage assistance and support 
from the central government, donor countries, and NGOs. 
E. RECOGNIZE ISSUES CAUSING REGIONAL CONFLICT OUTSIDE THE 
GWOT PARADIGM 
Both the United States and its GWOT coalition partners, including the 
Philippines, must understand the root causes that lead to conflict and terrorism, 
not just focus on stopping acts of terror or combating terrorist cells.  States must 
examine the issues that drive grievances and recruitment in order to effectively 
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eradicate terrorism and the attractiveness of its ideology and political aims as a 
societal solution.  Conflict within regions may utilize terror tactics to meet political, 
economic, and social end results.  Thus US CT strategy should address causes 
that breed terrorism, and not just turn attentions to the terrorists themselves.  
With new recruits everyday, policy should concentrate on the conditions and 
grievances that drive individual towards radical ideologies. 
Moreover, by addressing the political issues, socio-economic conditions, 
and societal grievances which foster recruitment and terrorism that lead to 
extreme violent actions, countries can establish more effective CT measures and 
produce the right incentive structure to eradicate conflict and acts of terrorism.  
This incentive to combat the root causes of terrorism (which in turn combats 
terrorism itself) creates a meaningful and lasting conflict resolution structure not 
predicate on the GWOT.  The GWOT as a campaign itself can succumb to 
political and societal pressures, as early as this November.  However, combating 
terrorism and treating conditions that lead to societal grievances that drive 
recruitment will always be major security concerns for states, despite the 
prevailing security environment nomenclature (e.g. the Cold War, GWOT).  
 
*     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     * 
 
In closing, as many experts advise, US policy should not be a one-size-
fits-all approach, especially under the war on terrorism.179  Policymakers must 
factor in a country’s government will and resources, military capabilities and 
competence, past CT/CI successes and failures (and the reasons behind them), 
and both international and domestic hot issues and discourses.  It is important to 
understand differing countries’, including the Philippines, motivations, relationship 
between the state, military, and society, as well as attitudes on and structures of 
informal networks versus formal institutions.  Moreover, US goals should focus 
both on the eradication of terrorism as well as the condition that favor terrorism.  
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And in formulating policy, the United States must exercise caution as not to 
inadvertently create a cycle of incentives to perpetuate problems within recipient 
countries.180  As this study is merely scratching the surface of this hypothesis, 
future analysis should focus on the collection hard raw data.  Unfortunately, at 
this juncture, not much raw data exists on the effects of negative incentives and 
profit from the GWOT.  Lastly, if policy, assistance, and reforms result in effective 
CT efforts and the eradication of terrorism, the Philippines can be seen as a 
successful test case of partnership in the global war against terrorism.   
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APPENDIX A: MAPS OF THE PHILIPPINES 
Figure 4.   Map of the Republic of the Philippines  





Figure 5.   Map of the southern region of the Philippines, including Mindanao and 
Sulu Archipelago  











APPENDIX B: PRESIDENT GLORIA ARROYO’S 14 PILLARS OF 
POLICY AND ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM181 
• Designates Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security as the 
lead anti-terrorism body 
• Seeks to undertake consolidate intelligence projects 
• Calls on the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine 
National Police (PNP) to address terrorist violence 
• Holds accountable all public and private organizations abetting 
terrorism 
• Seeks regional consensus and cooperation especially with Indonesia 
and Malaysia in the war against terrorism 
• Anticipates legal issues and concerns 
• Pursues Christian-Muslim dialogue and seeks to promote ecumenism 
• Calls for greater vigilance and concrete measures against all possible 
terrorist supplies, materials, and finances 
• Mobilizes disaster coordination efforts in the event of catastrophic 
attack 
• Secures critical infrastructure 
• Protects overseas workers and seeks their immediate transfer if 
needed 
• Seeks the integration of the global terrorist threat in the AFP/PNP 
modernization program 
• Asks for media responsibility 
• Seeks to address the socioeconomic and political roots of perceived 
fanaticism and irrational violence 
                                            
181 Rommel C. Banlaoi.  The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Quezon City: Strategic and 
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APPENDIX C: USAID ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR THE 
PHILIPPINES182 
USAID Assistance for the Philippines 
 
 
USAID assists Philippine partners in five areas:   
A. Economic reform and governance 
B. Conflict resolution in Mindanao  
C. Family planning, maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS and 
infectious diseases 
D. Environmental governance and energy   
E. Access to quality education 
USAID/Philippines also responds to humanitarian emergencies such as natural 
disasters. 
A. ECONOMIC REFORM AND GOVERNANCE 
1. Purpose 
Promote investment, job-creation, and poverty reduction by addressing 
corruption, weak rule of law, fiscal and financial deficiencies, and anti-competitive 
barriers.   
2. Institutions, policies and practices made transparent and 
accountable.  
USAID assists Philippine institutions that undertake programs to improve 
efficiency, transparency and accountability.  
• Strengthened banking supervisory capability to address money 
laundering 
                                            
182 USAID Assistance for the Philippines.  30 March 2004.  (http://www.usaid-
ph.gov/assistance_usaid.htm accessed June 2004).  
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• Strengthened management at the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
• More transparent and efficient government procurement 
• Strengthened enforcement of commercial law through the Department 
of Justice and the courts 
• Modernization of import valuation and post-entry audit at the Bureau of 
Customs 
• More transparency in the stock market and other non-bank financial 
sectors through strengthened oversight by the Philippine Securities 
and Exchange Commission. 
3. Competitive Barriers to Development of Infrastructure and 
Trade Removed   
Philippine leaders have used USAID's assistance in successful efforts to 
create innovative structures for investment in infrastructure, making government 
regulations more transparent, and allowing fuller participation in international 
trade and investment. 
• Science-based biotechnology guidelines 
• More competitive rate structures for consumer and business telephone 
service 
• More energetic protection of intellectual property rights, including plant 
variety protection 
• Expanded roll-on, roll-off facilities for inter-island shipping 
• New mechanisms to finance private road maintenance 
• Entry of more Philippine carriers into regional air routes 
B. MINDANAO 
The purpose of this program is to help consolidate peace in Mindanao and 
expand economic opportunity for all its people. 
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• Reintegration of Former Combatants:  Through its Livelihood 
Enhancement and Peace (LEAP) Program (and LEAP's predecessor 
programs), USAID has assisted, or is assisting, some 23,000 former 
MNLF combatants to become commercial level producers of corn, rice, 
or seaweed. We anticipate assisting at least 4,000 additional former 
combatants through LEAP.  USAID could implement a similar package 
for the MILF, upon signing of an MILF-GRP peace agreement. 
• Economic Opportunities:  Through its Growth with Equity in Mindanao 
(GEM) Program, USAID is carrying out a wide range of activities aimed 
at accelerating economic growth on Mindanao and ensuring that as 
many of Mindanao's 20 million people as possible benefit from that 
growth.  GEM facilitates transactions linking producers and markets in 
Mindanao with foreign and domestic investors, markets, and 
technology; supports crop enhancement programs, development of 
business support organizations, small to medium scale infrastructure 
and policy reforms to improve the business and investment climate; 
supports conflict resolution mechanisms; and improves governance 
and education in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.     
• Microfinance:  USAID is working with large numbers of Rural Banks 
and credit cooperatives in Mindanao to assist those institutions 
develop the capability to profitably serve the microenterprise market. 
C. HEALTH AND FAMILY PLANNING 
The purpose of this program is to achieve desired family size, improve 
maternal and child health, and prevent the rapid increase of HIV/AIDS and other 
infectious diseases. 
• Strengthening LGU Health Services:  GOP health facilities provide 
contraceptives and counseling to 70% of the family planning users in 
the country.  USAID assistance improves the quality and reach of 
services provided by local health facilities.  Working with the DOH and 
local governments, USAID supports the Matching Grants Program and 
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the Sentrong Sigla Movement to improve client access to quality family 
planning services at the rural health units and the barangay health 
stations nationwide.  USAID is also carrying out an infectious disease 
program to control the incidence of TB and combating the growing 
complacency regarding the threat of HIV/AIDS by supporting the 
monitoring of HIV/AIDS cases and education efforts to groups at 
highest risk of contracting the disease. 
• Improving Private Sector Provision of Health Services:  The role of the 
private sector in the delivery of family planning services has remained 
virtually untapped.  USAID is helping expand private sector 
participation in family planning promotion and service delivery, as well 
as in tuberculosis diagnosis and treatment.  USAID supports the 
FriendlyCare Foundation and the Well-Family Midwife Network of 
clinics providing affordable quality primary health care and family 
planning services to the working poor.   
• Increasing Social Acceptance of Family Planning:  A strong health care 
service delivery program, including family planning, requires a strong 
enabling environment.  USAID is taking the lead in mainstreaming 
family planning as a social norm and increasing community 
acceptance that will lead to greater access to and better acceptance of 
family planning and maternal and child health services. 
• Improving Financing, Policy and Contraceptive Self-reliance:  Towards 
a sustainable supply of contraceptives, USAID works with the DOH, 
the private sector and other donors to determine the best strategy to 
ensure contraceptive security, improve service provision and assure 
sustainable financing for information, services and products to facilitate 
delivery of family planning, maternal and child health services, TB and 
HIV/AIDS services in the Philippines.   This effort is critical given data 
from the 2000 census, which reported that the annual population 
growth rate has increased from 2.32 percent in 1995 to 2.36 percent in 
81 
2000 (3.86 percent in ARMM), resulting in a 2003 population estimate 
of 81 million. 
D. ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY 
1. Purpose  
Productive, Life Sustaining, Natural Resources Protected.  
2. Environmental Governance 
USAID is strengthening the ability of national and local government units 
and communities to address critical threats to the country’s forests and coastal 
resources, including over-fishing and use of destructive fishing practices, illegal 
logging and conversion of natural forests, and solid waste management.  USAID 
is promoting good governance – transparency and accountability – in enforcing 
environmental laws.  Special emphasis is being placed on assisting Muslim 
communities in Mindanao. 
• Improved Environmental Policies:  Key national and local organizations 
will be supported in their efforts to identify, analyze and improve priority 
policies. 
• Institution Building:  LGUs and communities receive training and 
follow-on technical assistance in improving the management of coastal 
and water resources, forests and solid waste.  Training is being 
conducted for the judicial and legal sectors, to equip them to better 
enforce environmental laws.  USAID also supports training on the 
management of hazardous wastes and technologies to reduce 
industrial pollution.  
• Environmental Advocacy:  Informational activities will be supported to 
help inform the public on key policy issues, and to build the political will 
to improve environmental management and enforcement. 
• Energy and Environment:  USAID is supporting an open, competitive 
market for generating and distributing electricity, expanding the use of 
renewable energy and natural gas, and reducing vehicle emissions, by 
improving policies, strengthening regulatory capabilities, promoting 
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private sector participation, and building public support for new 
initiatives. 
• Restructuring and privatization:  To improve efficiency in the power 
sector and increase energy security, USAID supports restructuring to 
encourage competition in power generation and distribution, 
privatization of government-owned transmission and generation 
assets, and the expanded use of cleaner indigenous fuels like natural 
gas. 
• Vehicle emissions:  USAID is encouraging the active participation of 
important stakeholders in the design and implementation of a 
nationwide vehicle safety inspection and emissions testing system. 
• Renewable energy:  USAID is building the capability of the private 
sector to electrify rural areas with renewable energy and to encourage 
local communities to participate in planning and carrying out activities 
to help ensure the sustainability of renewable energy investments. 
• Communication strategy:  USAID is helping our partners and civil 
society strengthen their ability to advocate for improved policies 
dealing with restructuring the power sector, reducing vehicle emissions 
and promoting renewable energy.   
E. QUALITY EDUCATION 
The purpose of this program is to increase access to quality education and 
livelihood skills in selected areas.  USAID will focus on four areas:  increasing 
community-based learning opportunities (especially in school-less conflict-
affected areas); promoting the reintegration of out-of-school youth into the 
peaceful, productive economy; improving teaching capacity in Math, Science, 
and English; and reforming education policy. 
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APPENDIX D: BACKGROUND ON INDIGENOUS 
INSURGENT/TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PHILIIPINES 
A. MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF)183 
1. Date of Founding 
The MILF was originally formed in 1977 when Hashim Salamat, supported 
by ethnic Maguindanaos and Muslims from Mindanao, split from the secular 
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), led by Nur Misuari. However, MILF 
structure and policy direction were not specifically defined until 1984, which is the 
official date of founding usually given.  
2. Status  
Malaysian-brokered ceasefire agreement signed in July 2003, although 
sporadic insurgent activity in the southern Philippines continues to be ascribed to 
the MILF.  
3. Political/Commercial/Charity Front Organizations  
The Bangsamoro People's Consultative Assembly is not a front 
organization for the MILF, but it does share many of the same members and is 
seen as a political forum for the organization. 
There has been considerable scrutiny of the links between the MILF and 
several Islamic charities. In particular, the international Islamic Relief 
Organization (IRO) stands accused of providing funds for the acquisition of arms 
for MILF. Mohammed Jamal Khalifa set up many branches of this charity 
organization and allegedly opened bank accounts in Hong Kong and other East 
Asian countries to facilitate the transfer of money to the MILF. The Afghan-based 
Al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization is under investigation on similar charges.  
4. Political/Religious Affiliation  
On the political front, the MILF has pushed a program of reformist 
Islamism based on a parallel government structure of popular committees and 
                                            
183 Paul Burton.  “Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”  Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism Online.  
8 January 2004.  (http://80-
www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_events.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/j
anesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0277.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&QueryText=&group=Moro+Islami
c+Liberation+Front+%28MILF%29 accessed May 2004). 
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functional organizations for youth, ulema (clergy) and women that has won much 
support. 
The religious ideology of the MILF, and the sense of community amongst 
the group's members, is so strong that members claim to consider themselves as 
Muslims first and Filipinos second. 
Some sources refer to the MILF as “Bangsamoro”; this is a generic name 
for the 13 ethnolinguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines.  
5. Pre-MILF Background (1946-1977) 
The Philippines was granted full independence in 1946, a year after the 
United States drove the Japanese from the islands. There was a strong objection 
by the Moro people to the inclusion of Mindanao and the islands of the 
southwest, as they believed that they had been separately governed for many 
years previously. Nevertheless, these concerns were swept aside and the new 
Philippine administration encouraged the resettlement of Christians in the 
Morolands in an attempt to quell Moro calls for independence. 
However, the secessionist sentiment was not pacified. The MNLF was 
formed in the late 1960s by a small group of students and intellectuals, but grew 
rapidly after the eruption of violence in Cotabato between 1969 and 1971 and the 
declaration of martial law by President Ferdinand Marcos. The MNLF became 
the largest grouping of armed separatists and fought a bloody war with the 
Philippine military, ending in a stalemate in the mid-1970s. 
Under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the 
Philippine government conducted negotiations with the insurgents, reaching a 
settlement known as the “Tripoli Agreement” in December 1976. According to 
this agreement, both sides would stop fighting and an autonomous Muslim region 
in the southern Philippines would be established consisting of 14 provinces. This 
Agreement was never fully honored by the Marcos regime, and the Mindanao 
Christian population strongly opposed the settlement, especially its endorsement 
of a legal Islamic framework. Fighting broke out once more at the end of 1977, 
although it was not as intense as witnessed before the Agreement. 
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6. MILF Formed (1977) 
At this time, the Muslim separatist movement began to fragment. Hashim 
Salamat broke away from the MNLF in 1977 over a leadership dispute and 
ideological differences with Nur Misuari, the Chairman of the MNLF. Salamat 
established the MILF in 1977. Factionalism coupled with general war weariness 
weakened the MNLF, who agreed to another ceasefire when Marcos was ousted 
from power. 
MILF activity, which was primarily aimed at the Filipino security services, 
continued at a relatively low level throughout the 1980s. Following a 1989 
plebiscite, an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was 
established, based in Cotabato, consisting of the four provinces of Tawi-Tawi, 
Sulu, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. In 2001 it was expanded to include the 
island of Basilan and Marawai City in central Mindanao. Many of the ex-MNLF 
leaders joined the political institutions of this body. Nevertheless, the MILF 
rejected this institution, believing it to be riddled with corruption and unable to 
promote complete Muslim independence. 
7. MILF Activity (1990s) 
Between 1991 and 1994, the MILF was responsible for a number of 
attacks against Christian communities, army patrols and government 
representatives. Arson and bomb attacks were perpetuated against churches 
and murders took place in remote Christian villages. In April 1995, in what was 
probably the worst atrocity in recent times, a group of guerrillas from the MILF 
and other groups raided the town of Ipil and massacred over 50 people. Several 
dozen others were taken hostage and then killed. In another serious bout of 
violence two years later, 14 people were killed in a cinema in Iligan, in Mindanao. 
More people were killed in 2000, when the MILF slaughtered 13 Christian 
plantation workers and injured 14 others who were traveling on a bus. 
Ceasefire violations escalate (2000): Several attempts at a ceasefire with the 
MILF have been made by the Arroyo administration since 2000. As MILF military 
and political confidence grew against the backdrop of early 2000's first ceasefire 
attempt, there began a dangerous game of military brinkmanship. The MILF 
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sought Manila's recognition of its camps and a joint boundary delineation, 
ostensibly to prevent military friction. However, as increasingly frustrated Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) commanders realized, recognition implied a 
legitimization of no-go areas in which the MILF was free to train, organize and 
build up its forces. As both the AFP and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces 
(BIAF) probed and feinted, ceasefire violations increased with each side blaming 
the other. 
When the storm finally broke in April 2000, it clearly caught the MILF off 
balance. In a four-month campaign of mid-2000 backed by sustained air and 
artillery bombardments, AFP forces overran most of the MILF's 46 camps and 
occupied the major ones. The high point was the July 2000 capture of Camp Abu 
Bakr: an event celebrated by the then President Joseph Estrada and his troops 
with beer and roast pork near the ruins of the camp's main mosque - an insult 
that will not soon be forgotten in the Muslim south. 
At the time, the humbling of the MILF boosted both AFP morale and 
Estrada's public image in the Christian north. In retrospect, however, the results 
of the campaign are more difficult to gauge. The AFP unquestionably humiliated 
the MILF and disproved its claims to have moved beyond its “guerrilla stage” to 
the point of achieving a conventional capability to defend its camps. "On the 
strategic level, we were able to show them they're in no position to win", said 
then AFP spokesman Brigadier General Edilberto Adan. 
Nevertheless, the “war of the camps” was a drain on the AFP's budget. At 
its conclusion, it tied down large numbers of troops in static-area denial duties 
around the six major camps to prevent MILF re-infiltration. As well as draining 
development budgets and damaging communal relations, the war also displaced 
some 600,000 people, mostly Muslims. 
Although humiliated, the BIAF did not suffer particularly heavy losses. By 
their own count around 100 guerrillas were killed, while independent analysts 
estimate the losses to have been about 300. As one senior AFP commander said 
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in February 2002: "We killed a few hundred; they recruited a few hundred. Net 
change: zero." 
8. AFP and Eid-ul-Adha Attack (February 2003)  
By early 2003, hardliners in the defense establishment had seized the 
initiative in Mindanao. Stating their intention to go after criminal elements, notably 
members of the Pentagon Gang, allegedly sheltered by the MILF, the AFP 
launched an attack on an MILF stronghold in Pikit, North Cotabato, on 11 
February. The bombing of the village of Buliok came as members of the MILF, 
led by Chairman Salamat Hashim, and residents of Buliok and nearby villages 
were gathered in prayer marking Eid-ul-Adha, a Muslim holy day celebrating the 
end of the Hajj. 
President Arroyo ordered a halt to the attack soon after it began, but it 
took days before the offensive was stopped, raising questions as to the cause of 
the delay. The attack outraged the MILF and other Muslims. Subsequently, 
fighting escalated with the military accusing the MILF of being behind a pair of 
bombings in Mindanao's largest city, the overwhelmingly Christian Davao City, 
and attacks on civilian targets in other Christian communities in Mindanao. There 
were also warnings that the MILF would extend its war with a bombing campaign 
in Manila. The MILF denies charges of targeting civilians. MILF spokesman 
Kabula described the MILF posture in early May 2003 as “active self defense.” 
The AFP took a similar posture into May 2003 when it shifted to one of 
“punitive action.” According to AFP Vice Chief of Staff Rodolfo Garcia, the 
military would actively pursue MILF units accused of crimes against civilian 
populations. Following the Davao bombings, the government also posted arrest 
warrants and bounties for the top leaders of the MILF, including Chairman 
Hashim and spokesman Kabula. 
New ceasefire provides fresh hope (July 2003): With the signing of a new 
Malaysian-brokered ceasefire agreement in July 2003, the government began 
preparing for the resumption of negotiations with the MILF in late 2003. 
Exploratory talks were held in October, after which both sides were awaiting word 
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from Kuala Lumpur as to the date for the resumption of formal negotiations. Talks 
had broken off in May 2003 after three months of fighting between government 
and MILF forces - the most serious outbreak of violence in years. Allegations of 
ceasefire violations by the MILF and a February AFP offensive against criminal 
elements that resulted in an attack on a Muslim community led to the renewal of 
hostilities. The violence that followed included bombings and attacks on civilian 
targets that the government attributed to the MILF. 
Diplomatic intervention from Malaysia and the fact that the military had 
demonstrated its capacity to take on the MILF eventually brought about the 
renewal of the ceasefire. Malaysia will also be part of a ceasefire monitoring 
team that will go to Mindanao for an assessment of the situation there. Bahrain 
and Libya have also volunteered to send representatives to the monitoring team. 
The gap between the beginning of the ceasefire and the resumption of 
talks was partly due to the death of MILF founder and chairman Salamat Hashim 
in July 2003.  
9. MILF Aims/Objectives  
Though nominally committed to an independent Islamic state, the MILF 
has confirmed a willingness to reach a settlement based on greater autonomy for 
Mindanao, with the promise that it would continue to pursue its goal of secession 
through peaceful and legal political means. Despite their reputation, MILF leaders 
typically follow a brand of Islam that is more moderate than that of the Islamic 
fundamentalists of the Middle East. They refuse publicly to criticize the US and 
remain officially committed to peace negotiations. 
Although many MILF leaders have deeply held religious beliefs, they 
recognize that many of the gripes of their supporters and followers have to do 
with the extreme poverty of Muslim Mindanao and the underdevelopment of its 
economic and social structures. 
10. Government Aims/Objectives  
Despite periods of intense combat, the government's preference for a 
long-term solution to the Muslim issue in the south is not in doubt. It would like to 
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expand on the 1996 settlement with the MNLF and persuade the MILF, which is 
an offshoot of the MNLF, to co-operate with the regional administration, the 
ARMM. 
While the establishment of the ARMM effectively co-opted the MNLF, the 
MILF has consistently rejected the ARMM as a vehicle for addressing grassroots 
Muslim grievances. These complaints include widespread poverty, poor 
education, limited government services, and underdevelopment of the regional 
economy. The regional administration, based in Cotabato, is overstaffed and 
riddled with corruption. It enjoys virtually no fiscal autonomy from Manila, while in 
effect adding one more layer of bureaucracy, inefficiency and graft between 
Manila and local communities.  
11. Leadership  
Salamat Hashim founded the MILF in 1977 and was the movement's 
Chairman until his natural death in July 2003. Born in Maguindano, Salamat 
studied in Egypt and participated in the student activism erupting in Cairo in the 
1960s. He returned to the Philippines to play an active role in the Moro 
revolutionary movement. 
Hashim's long-time deputy Al Haj Murad Ebrahim assumed leadership of 
the organization. Ebrahim has been involved in the peace process for many 
years and appears to be committed to moving ahead with negotiations. While 
stating the MILF's continuing commitment to negotiating a settlement, Ebrahim 
took advantage of the ceasefire to consolidate his leadership of the organization. 
Eid Kabalu is the MILF's spokesman and Muhammad Ameen acts as the 
group's secretary.  
12. Command Structure  
The MILF is run and managed by MILF civil affairs officials, supported by 
MILF troops who protect the organization from the encroachment of the 
Philippine government. 
The executive branch of MILF was headed by Salamat Hashim from the 
group's formation in 1977 until his death in July 2003. This body determines the 
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direction of MILF policy and is upheld and supported by regional and municipal 
committees. 
The Supreme Islamic court heads the judiciary branch of the MILF and 
handles criminal and civil cases. 
A legislative branch, the Majlis al-Shura, was founded in 1991 to provide 
an intermediary between the executive and judiciary branches of MILF. Its 
primary role is to initiate new legislation and resolutions. 
The group's military wing, the BIAF, is organized along conventional 
guerrilla/military lines, with a tiered structure of regular, guerrilla and local units. 
There are six territorial divisions based on Mindanao, which comprise of between 
six and eight brigades. A Special Operations Group (SOG) runs separately from 
these brigades and is tasked with high-risk operations, including kidnap and 
sabotage. 
The MILF executive command has lost some of its cohesion in recent 
years. The Central Committee is increasingly unable to fully control all of the 
group's activities on the ground and individual cadres are believed to have 
organized their own initiatives independently of the central command. This helps 
to explain how MILF activity continues regardless of the ceasefire agreement. 
There is also a tradition of loyalty to regional chiefs, which makes it more difficult 
for the leadership to retain overall control of all factions of the group.  
13. Membership and Support  
By May 2003, AFP intelligence estimates put MILF strength at 11,000 to 
12,000 combatants with slightly over 9,000 firearms. Western intelligence 
estimates have generally put BIAF strength higher, at some 15,000 men with 
over 11,000 firearms. MILF claims of having six divisions of roughly 20,000 
members, two-thirds armed, are generally considered far too high.  
14. Insurgent Alliances/Linkages  
It is likely that the MILF has used its foreign connections to support its own 
goals. The MILF leadership has shown itself to be quite capable and focused on 
its particular territorial imperatives. It understands the importance of presenting a 
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public face that is not anti-Christian nor anti-progress, thus it avoids the extremist 
pronouncements of Islamic fundamentalists. Its social base is also broader than 
those of militant Islamisists in the Arab world and South and Central Asia. The 
Philippine Muslim community while poor is relatively progressive with many of its 
leaders schooled in liberal Philippine universities. While some analysts describe 
the MILF as a fundamentalist group, a definition that identifies it ideologically with 
Al-Qaeda and similar organizations, it is probably more accurate to describe it as 
“reformist” and thus ideologically distinct from the international organizations it 
maintains some links with. 
While conceding the Front has hosted foreign Islamic proselytizers, MILF 
leaders have consistently disavowed links to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. 
They have also denied having allowed foreign militants to use MILF facilities and 
have gone on record condemning the attacks of 11 September 2001. 
The MILF has also been careful to avoid criticism of the United States, the 
principle enemy of Al-Qaeda and similar international terrorist groups. Officially, 
the MILF has remained quiet about US involvement in combating the Abu Sayyaf 
Group (ASG), an organization it publicly denounces, and it kept its vow to avoid 
sympathy attacks connected to the US-led invasion of Iraq. The MILF has also 
courted the US development agency, USAID.   
In the interests of safeguarding peace talks, the administration in Manila 
has played down the accusations and given the MILF the benefit of the doubt, 
usually pointing to a lack of real proof or the presence of factions within the MILF 
unrepresentative of its leadership. Even amidst the intensifying conflict of early 
2003, leaders of the Armed Forces of the Philippines were cautious to say links 
between the MILF and international terrorist organizations could not be 
confirmed. 
Reports suggest that the MILF has also had direct contact with Al-Qaeda 
operatives, although whether these contacts amount to sustained links let alone 
operational co-operation is unclear. One intelligence report points to a June 2000 
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visit to the Maluku region of Indonesia by Al-Qaeda leaders Ayman al-Zawahiri 
and Mohammed Atef. 
During a visit apparently intended to explore the possibility of expanding 
Al-Qaeda's presence in Southeast Asia, the two are reported to have met 
members of various jihadi groups including unnamed members of the MILF. 
MILF connections to both the Middle East and the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
region are long-standing. Its former chairman Selamat Hashim, a widely 
respected Islamic scholar, studied both in Saudi Arabia and later at Cairo's Al-
Azhar University where he was influenced by the writing of the leading theorists 
of the Islamic state, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani Abul A'ala 
Maududi. Following the 1977 split with the mainstream and secular MNLF, the 
leadership of Hashim's New MNLF (to become the MILF in 1984) based itself in 
Pakistan where it was inevitably influenced by the military and ideological 
currents of the Afghan jihad. 
According to MILF sources, several hundred MILF cadre were trained 
during the 1980s in Afghan guerrilla camps in Pakistan - run by both the Ittihad-i-
Islami (Islamic Union) of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (another Al-Azhar alumnus), and 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. Some went on to gain hands-on military 
experience in the hills around the southwestern Afghan town of Khost. While the 
Filipino Moro mujahideen would almost inevitably have met and possibly trained 
and fought with Arab fighters operating under Osama bin Laden's umbrella, there 
is no evidence to indicate that at that time MILF cadres established any 
organizational connections with Al-Qaeda or trained in its camps. 
However, given the international network of terrorism that has existed for a 
number of years it is likely that members of the MILF have trained with Al-Qaeda 
forces, but this does not necessarily equate to the two groups operating in 
tandem. Rather, it can be viewed within the context of a “brotherhood of 
terrorism” as seen with the involvement of the Irish Republican Army with the 
FARC in Columbia. 
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From around 1995 until the present, the MILF has returned the favor to 
foreign fighters in its own camps in the spirit of jihadi solidarity. The numbers that 
passed through MILF camps in these years remains a source of debate among 
analysts but several hundred appear to have benefited from the Front's 
hospitality. They either joined MILF cadres for well-organized training courses at 
its “academy” in camp Abu Bakr; or operated with MILF units in the field; or both. 
In October 1997, the issue of foreigners operating with the MILF came 
briefly and dramatically to the fore when two foreigners armed with grenade 
launchers and M-16 assault rifles staged a bizarre suicide attack on the 
headquarters of the AFP's 6th Division at Camp Siongco outside Cotabato City - 
not far from Abu Bakr. After killing three Filipino soldiers and wounding 10 
civilians, both were shot dead. 
While foreign guest-militants evidently included some Pakistanis, Arabs 
and possibly Afghans, it seems probable that Indonesians, virtually 
indistinguishable from Mindanaons, formed the bulk of the intake. When in July 
2000, AFP troops overran Camp Abu Bakr, Indonesian passports were found 
amid a large quantity of documents. Some of the Indonesian intake included 
trainees from Aceh. Two Acehnese were said to have been killed in the intense 
fighting outside Camp Abu Bakr in May or June 2000. 
MILF and Indonesian movements: Other guest-militants appear to have 
been affiliated with an organization called the Indonesian Islamic Liberation Front 
(IILF). To judge from its name, the group seeks to model itself on the MILF; or 
serve more narrowly as an Indonesian wing of the MILF. 
There is also strong reason to assume that IILF or other Indonesians 
sympathetic to the MILF organized the 1 August 2000 car-bombing that narrowly 
missed killing Manila's ambassador, Leonides Caday, in Jakarta. That attack, 
which killed two and wounded 21, came shortly after AFP forces overran Camp 
Abu Bakr, the MILF's political and spiritual capital. Far less easy to gauge is 
whether MILF elements might have specifically ordered the attack (Front 
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spokesmen denied any involvement); or whether it was the work of independent 
Indonesian sympathizers conducted as a token of jihadi solidarity. 
The extent to which the MILF and its Indonesian associates have 
interfaced with the Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), the regional Al-Qaeda affiliate, is 
another area open to debate. Mounting evidence suggests that the links between 
the various groups are well established. It would be entirely logical for a 
Southeast Asian affiliate of Al-Qaeda seeking to promote insurgency and 
subversion in the region to look to the MILF as well-placed to provide secure 
training bases. 
At the very least, the MILF itself has been linked to JI through the person 
of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, the young Indonesian explosives expert arrested on 
15 January 2002 in Manila's mainly Muslim suburb of Quiapo. Al-Ghozi - an 
associate of the JI's main operations officer Isamuddin Riduan, better known as 
Hambali - has admitted visiting MILF camps for various periods between 1996 
and 2000 to instruct trainees in the use of explosives. He has also admitted to 
financing the December 2000 bomb attacks in Manila, operating with Yunus 
Mukhlis, a MILF special operations cadre. Al-Ghozi later rashly rang the police 
from his own mobile phone to claim the attacks were in revenge for the campaign 
on the MILF camps.  In 2003, al-Ghozi was killed in an encounter with 
government forces after escaping from prison. He was linked to operatives from 
the ASG at the time. 
Within the Philippines, the MILF influences or controls several Non 
Government Organizations (NGOs) and has friendly relations with several 
elected officials within its zone of operation, including areas now controlled by the 
AFP and the government. The military has accused it of protecting other armed 
groups in Mindanao, including the Pentagon Gang. The nature of relations 
between the MILF and the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s 
Army (CPP-NPA) are a matter of some debate. No one questions the fact that 
the two rebel organizations have some links. The office of the president has 
charged that the CPP-NPA is training young members of the MILF; however, in 
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May 2003, AFP Vice Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Rodolfo Garcia said 
connections between the two were limited to safe passage agreements, allowing 
units of either group passage through the other's areas of operation.  
15. Rival Groups  
The MILF has faced several rival groups during its campaign for 
independence. The group was traditionally an opponent of the MNLF, although 
both organizations have recently signed a unity agreement. Clashes have also 
occurred with the NPA and ASG, although there are reports that claim some 
degree of co-operation with the MILF. The group's main rivals are Christian self 
defense organizations.  
16. Methods of Funding  
Members of the MILF have several different sources of funding. Internally, 
the group raises money from “revolutionary taxes”, involving kidnap and extortion 
rings. Voluntary contributions are believed to account for a substantial sum, 
especially when the annual harvest is plentiful and rural workers can contribute 
more to their cause. A significant amount of money is sourced externally, from 
“sympathizers” in Europe and Australia sent through legal channels to support 
social, religious and educational programs. 
According to MILF claims, nearly $200,000 was pledged to the group 
following Ramadan in 2001. A large part of this money is believed to have been 
wired from the United Arab Emirates via a bank in New York.  
17. Area of Operation  
The MILF's camps, 46 of which have existed across Mindanao at various 
times, were not solely military facilities but were extensive guerrilla base areas 
with civilian populations that became test-tubes for the MILF experiment in 
Islamic governance under sharia law (see Figure 6).  
Of the six main bases, the largest and most important was Abu Bakr on 
the borders of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. There, to pursue the Maoist 
analogy, the Front developed its own Yenan, a political, and even spiritual, 
capital where it ran village communities with schools, religious seminaries and 
Islamic courts. A military academy also trained BIAF officers and recruits as well 
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as hosting a range of visitors and jihadi fighters from the Middle East and 
Southeast Asia. 
The MILF's forces are largely deployed in Central Mindanao with smaller 
formations found in other parts of the region. The MILF admits to being weak in 
Tawi Tawi and Sulu. The bulk of the MILF's forces are found in the following 































18. Tactics/Methodology  
The MILF have carried out several kidnapping campaigns in order to bring 
political and media attention to their cause and to boost funding. Wealthy citizens 
and businesses in Manila have been known to pay out several million dollars for 
the return of hostages. Before August 2001's ceasefire agreement, MILF guerrilla 
forces regularly bombed military and civilian targets. 
The MILF has shifted its strategy, reverting from its overly ambitious 
pretensions to a regular capability to highly mobile guerrilla operations. At one 
level, the reorganization reduced the MILF's offensive punch. While before the 
“war of the camps” in mid-2000, the MILF could concentrate forces of up to two 
battalions (around 1,000 troops), its offensive potential has subsequently 
dropped to company and platoon-sized operations. On the other hand, the AFP's 
task of keeping track of the BIAF guerrilla force and its leadership is now a far 
tougher proposition. 
By the end of 2000, it was clear that open-ended guerrilla conflict suited 
neither side. After a conflict that had disrupted its command and control and 
logistics infrastructure and expended large quantities of scarce ammunition, the 
BIAF needed a breathing space to reorganize and re-equip - a program which it 
has been pursuing. For its part, the AFP faced shrinking budgets and severely 
overstretched manpower as the irritant of the ASG on Basilan became a major 
international embarrassment.  
19. Training  
The MILF military headquarters were located at Camp Abubakar, on the 
borders of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur, which is where most military training 
was carried out in the past. However, following the capture of this and many of 
MILF's 46 subsidiary camps in August 2000 by the Philippine government, 
training grounds are thought to have moved into the jungle.   
There is also evidence that talented members have been sent abroad. 
Reports of the numbers of Filipinos trained in Afghanistan are thought to be 
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generally exaggerated by the authorities, but since the mid-1980s a number of 
MILF members have attended military and religious training courses in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Members of MILF have admitted to recruiting young children to their 
training camps, some as young as 10 years old. Many of these are sent to 
madrassahs before undergoing military training. Recruits are given a monthly 
salary.  
20. Foreign Bases/Supply Lines  
The MILF has obtained arms and equipment from both domestic and 
overseas sources. In addition to equipment stolen or captured in combat from 
Philippine military and police units, MILF has exploited its Islamic links to acquire 
weapons from the Middle East, possibly from Libya, Iran, Lebanon and Sudan. 
There have also been reports that the group may have benefited from 
consignments of arms from China, initially destined for Cambodia but which have 
been sold on through Thailand. Vietnam and Malaysia have also been accused 
in the past of assisting the group with weapons donations. 
IILF cadres are believed by some regional intelligence sources to have 
assisted in trans-shipment of munitions to the MILF through Indonesia.  
21. Weaponry/Arsenal  
Precise details of the MILF arsenal are unknown. However it is known to 
have a variety of modern small arms and machine guns, rocket launchers and 
other anti-tank weapons, and mortars. There are unconfirmed reports the MILF 
also has surface-to-air missiles. Much of its weaponry was acquired from 
Philippine police and military forces in battle, stolen from security units or 
acquired through sympathizers.  
The MILF obtains its weapons from both foreign and domestic sources. 
Locally, much of the MILF's arsenal is thought to have been taken from Philippine 
police and the military in battle, donated by sympathizers or stolen. Many 
weapons have also been stolen from the rapidly expanding security service.  
22. Communications  
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Although the groups are a rural-based guerrilla organization, they have an 
in-depth website, from which they aim to attract support. Many guerrillas also 
carry mobile telephones and have used text messaging as a way of 
communicating between battalions. They also communicate through encrypted e-
mail, short wave radios and couriers.  
23. Level of Threat  
A final resolution of the Mindanao conflict will require constitutional change 
granting considerably more autonomy than the unitary state has room for. In 
addition to fiscal autonomy, there must be a greater role for Islamic law in 
predominantly Muslim areas. There will also be need to craft an agreement that 
is acceptable to the multitude of political interests in the Muslim south; this 
means addressing the concerns of the MILF, while not alienating the MNLF, 
mainstream Muslim politicians, religious leaders and others. Some political 
reformers believe reconstituting Philippine government along federal lines could 
create the framework for a more fully realized autonomy. 
Joint exercises between the Philippine (AFP) and US militaries on Basilan 
and the “war against terrorism” have done little to improve the peace process 
climate. While it has avoided criticizing the US deployment, the MILF has 
attempted to capitalize on the presence of several hundred of its fighters on 
Basilan by asking the government to co-ordinate military operations. It has asked 
the AFP to inform it in advance of operations in its areas of influence to avoid 
accidental clashes that might involve US forces operating with AFP units. The 
AFP has dismissed the proposal as another MILF attempt to legitimize claims to 
territorial control. 
Indeed, hardliners in the military have taken pleasure in playing up the 
MILF's alleged infractions both on Basilan and beyond. These allegedly include 
attempts to reinfiltrate former camps; the stepping up of attacks on civilian and 
military targets in southwestern Mindanao; the provision of shelter to ASG 
elements on Basilan; a linking up with pro-Misuari MNLF renegades; the 
harboring of KFR gangs, notably the so-called Pentagon Gang, as a “dirty tricks 
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arm” to drum up financial support; and consorting with international terrorist 
groups. 
The ground situation in Mindanao is complicated by fluid factional 
loyalties, local alliances and banditry by ostensibly politically-motivated armed 
groups. Equally, MILF links to foreign jihadi groups are difficult to overlook. 
However, there is little doubt that hard-line elements in Manila sought with some 
success to orchestrate a campaign to whip up anti-MILF hysteria. 
It may be that the propaganda assault against the MILF was merely aimed 
at pushing the Front onto the back foot and gaining advantage at the next round 
of talks. However, it may be that hawks in the military intend to push the MILF to 
the wall, triggering a new round of hostilities to be portrayed as an extension of 
the international war on terror. What is clear is that any hopes the Arroyo 
administration might have entertained for a Mindanao settlement followed by 
mini-Marshall plans and rapid economic development can be put on hold for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Table 2.   History/Overview of the MILF Campaign 
1977 Rift within the MNLF saw an Islamist wing led by Selamat Hashim break 
away from the Front's secular mainstream led by Nur Misuari. 
  
1984 MILF formed. Influenced by Maoist revolutionary theory, the MILF 
adopted a four-point strategy involving Islamization; self-reliance; political 
organization; and a military build-up. Gradually, the Front extended its 
reach beyond an ethnically Maranao and Maguindanaon heartland in 
south central Mindanao to influence much of the island. 
  
1996 MILF benefited politically and militarily from the peace deal signed 
between the MNLF and Manila in September 1996 that saw MNLF 
Chairman Nur Misuari take office as governor of the four province ARMM. 
The MILF rejected offers to come in from the jungle and continued to 
champion the cause of an independent “Bangsamoro” homeland, drawing 
strength from Misuari's increasingly troubled experiment in government. 
  
1997 MILF and Manila signed an accord for the cessation of hostilities. This 
paved the way for several rounds of peace talks held between 1997 and 
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2000 as the Manila administration of President Fidel Ramos attempted to 
replicate with the MILF the settlement reached with the MNLF. However, 
the talks, which were held without foreign mediation, remained mired in 
technical issues relating to ceasefire monitoring and, critically, the status 
of MILF camps. 
  
2000 May. MILF-government talks broke down and violence swiftly escalated. 
  
 July. Philippine army undertook a major assault upon the MILF military 
headquarters at Camp Abu Bakr, capturing the camp. However, most 
guerrillas had evacuated the camp before its seizure; therefore the MILF 
retains considerable military forces. 
  
 In August its senior leader fled abroad and the organization undertook a 
series of bombings in Manila. 
  
 The MILF's military headquarters, Camp Abubakar, and most of its 
subsidiary training camps, were captured by Philippine army forces. 
  
2001 January. New Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo followed 
through on feelers she had already extended to Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohammed to elicit Kuala Lumpur's support for a new peace 
offensive. 
  
 In February Arroyo declared a unilateral suspension of hostilities, holding 
out the hope of a “mini-Marshall Plan” of economic rescue for the Muslim 
South. 
  
 March. An exploratory round of talks between Manila's pointman for the 
peace process, Eduardo Ermita, and MILF vice-chairman for military 
affairs, Al Haj Murad Ibrahim, secretly held in Kuala Lumpur, resulting in a 
framework agreement. 
  
 August. In the Libyan capital, Tripoli, agreement was reached on a three-
point agenda for renewed negotiations involving security, rehabilitation 
and development, and at MILF insistence, the issue of the Bangsamoro 
“ancestral domains”. 
  




2002 March. Frontpage articles in the Manila press cited military intelligence 
reports revealing that Selamat Hashim had slipped back to Mindanao 
from foreign exile to direct MILF attacks on government forces. 
  
 Arroyo announced that formal panel-to-panel negotiations with the MILF 
would be temporarily downgraded to “back-channel contacts”. 
  
2003 AFP launched an attack on an MILF stronghold in Pikit, North Cotabato, 
on 11 February. The bombing of the village of Buliok came as members of 
the MILF, led by Chairman Salamat Hashim, and residents of Buliok and 
nearby villages were gathered in prayer marking Eid-ul-Adha, a Muslim 
holy day celebrating the end of the Hajj. Three months of hostilities 
ensued. 
  
 Two bombs in the southern Philippines city of Davao - one in March and 
another in April - left over 40 people dead and many others injured. MILF 
were immediately blamed, but President Arroyo indicated that regional 
extremist movements JI were the likely culprits. 
  
 Salamat Hashim died of natural causes in July 2003. Hashim's long-time 
deputy Al Haj Murad Ebrahim assumed leadership of the organization. 
  
 Malaysian-brokered ceasefire agreement signed in July 2003. Exploratory 
talks were held in October, after which both sides were awaiting word 




B. ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)184 
1. Group  
The group was originally known as the Mujahideen Commando Freedom 
Fighters, then Al Harakat-ul Al Islamiyya and finally as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  
2. Date of Founding  
MCFF was founded in the mid 1980s. The date for the founding of ASG is 
usually given as the late 1980s.  
3. Status  
Active, although its capacity to undertake significant action has been 
substantially reduced by a series of US/AFP military and political actions since 11 
September 2001.  
4. Political/Religious affiliation  
Ostensibly radical Sunni Muslim, although it became clear that the group's 
religious agenda was essentially a cover for its criminal activities.  
5. Background  
ASG split from the MNLF in the early 1990s under the leadership of 
Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani. Janjalani continued to maintain control over ASG 
until he was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. His 
younger brother, Qadaffi Janjalani, replaced him as nominal leader of the group. 
ASG's first recorded action was the 1991 attack on a military checkpoint in 
Sumagadang near Isabela. Wahab, the ASG leader who commanded the attack 
fled to Malaysia only to return a few years later to campaign for governor. After 
the 1991 action, wider bomb attacks followed in 1992. These attacks targeted 
locations in Zamboanga and Davao and resulted in an increasing public 
awareness of ASG. 
The group demonstrated its propensity to undertake kidnap-for-ransom 
missions throughout the early 1990s, although it was not until 1993's kidnap of 
                                            
184 Paul Burton.  “Abu Sayyaf Group.”  Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism Online.  8 
January 2004.  (http://80-
www4.janes.com.libproxy.nps.navy.mil/subscribe/jtic/doc_view_events.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/j
anesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0093.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&QueryText=&group=Abu+Sayyaf
+Group+%28ASG%29 accessed May 2004). 
105
US language scholar Charles Walton that the ASG came to international 
prominence. 
Activity against foreigners escalated in 2000. In July, the group kidnapped 
three French journalists who were released after ransoms were paid. Buoyed by 
their success, the ASG abducted 21 persons from a resort on Pandanan Island. 
With Libya mediating, several million dollars were paid for their release. In 
August the ASG kidnapped and accused Jeffrey Schilling, a US citizen who had 
met with a senior guerrilla leader, of being a member of the CIA and demanded 
$2 million for his release. Schilling was rescued in April 2001. 
ASG continued its trend of kidnappings in 2001 with the May abduction of 
17 tourists. Among those taken were three Americans. When government 
security forces attempted to pursue the kidnappers, the ASG seized 200 more 
hostages from a nearby church and hospital. 
AFP pressure helped to resolve the three-year long hostage crisis. All the 
hostages captured by the ASG during their highly profitable kidnap campaigns 
between 2000 and 2002 have escaped, slipping away from their captors during 
military pursuit operations. 
US/AFP counter ASG: In January 2002 approximately 1,200 US troops 
arrived in the Philippines to support government action against the ASG. A large 
number of these were US Special Forces personnel who were sent to train 
Philippine forces. 
By July 2002 many of the special forces units who had been engaged in 
the training of Philippine forces departed. However, several hundred support 
personnel remained on Basilan to carry out infrastructure projects and medical 
assistance. Following this training, the Philippine government promised an all-out 
effort to destroy ASG forces. 
Supported by the US-AFP joint training exercise Baliktan 02-1, AFP 
operations of 2002 had undeniable impact. Insurgent numbers estimated in mid-
2001 at between 800 and 850, had been cut back by late 2002 to around 450; 
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and one prominent leader, Abu Sabaya, had been killed. On Basilan island, a 
stronghold where the group had been founded, AFP units supported by US 
Special Operations Forces instructors drove scores of ASG gunmen into hiding 
or to flight. 
A build up of forces in August 2002 saw the AFP's Task Force Comet - 
based on the Philippine Army's (PA) 104th Brigade and the Philippine Marine 
Corps (PMC) 3rd Brigade and responsible for Sulu and Tawi-tawi provinces - 
reinforced to 11 battalions or over 5,000 troops including Army, Marine, and 
Scout Ranger special forces units. Operation “Endgame”, intended finally to 
break the back of the ASG on the island, was launched in early September. 
Despite heavy clashes in the weeks that followed, the endgame remains 
elusive. Furthermore, the pressure of operations elsewhere has seen Task Force 
Comet reduced to six battalions - three infantry battalions organic to the PA 
104th Brigade, and the three battalions of the PMC 3rd Brigade. A lower tempo 
of operations in 2003 involved sweeps and raids targeted on suspected insurgent 
hideouts and camps (although ASG units are now reluctant to build even semi-
permanent camps.) 
This sustained pressure in Jolo's western hinterland - in particular the 
districts of Patikul, Talipao, Indanan and Maibung - served to disrupt the ASG's 
planning, training and kidnap-for-ransom activities.  
6. Aims/Objectives  
Initially, the ASG appeared to fight for the establishment of an 
independent Islamic republic in Mindanao, on surrounding Islands and in the 
Sulu Archipelago. This veneer of Islamo-separatist ideology was gradually 
replaced by movement's degeneration into a brutal criminal enterprise 
preoccupied largely with the local kidnap-for-ransom industry.  
7. Leadership  
Khaddafi Abubakr Janjalani, aka Abu Mokhtar (ASG amir): Younger 
brother of Abdurajak Janjalani, original founder of the ASG, Khaddafi became 
amir of the ASG after his brother's death in a December 1998 shoot-out with 
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police on Basilan. Having earlier attended school in Zamboanga, he undertook 
religious training in Marawi City, Mindanao. He is generally considered to lack his 
brother's leadership qualities, and takes decisions in consultation with other ASG 
leaders. His current whereabouts are uncertain, but having left Jolo in April 2003 
he could be on the Zamboanga Peninsula. Reports that he landed in early July 
2003 near Palimbang in Sultan Kudarat province, southern Mindanao, with a 
group of 30 fighters have not been confirmed. 
Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, aka Abu Musab (Basilan): Effectively the ASG's 
second-in-command, Hapilon is the eldest of four brothers who joined the group. 
(Sahinon Hapilon was shot dead by police at a Zamboanga bus terminal in May 
2002; Bakkal Hapilon, wounded in March 2002, and Isah Hapilon still operate 
with their elder brother.) In April 2003, Isnilon was reported to have left Jolo with 
Janjalani for Pilas Island, and later the Zamboanga peninsula. He is believed to 
be either still on the peninsula or to have slipped back to Basilan. 
Hamsiraji Marusi Sali, aka Jose Ramirez (Basilan): Hamsiraji is the leader 
of a Basilan group and given to frequent, if erratic, telephone interviews with the 
local media. In January 2002, "Hamsi" was quoted as welcoming US military civic 
aid projects on Basilan; in early March 2003 he was quick to claim responsibility 
for the Davao airport bombing that killed 22 people (a claim dismissed both by 
the authorities and the MILF). In June 2003 his group was reported by military 
intelligence to be planning to kidnap teachers from remote villages on Basilan. 
Jainal Antel Sali, aka Abu Solaiman, “the Engineer” (Basilan): From a 
wealthy family and well educated, Abu Solaiman originally trained as an engineer 
but later fought in MNLF ranks and was wounded several times. He has served 
in intelligence functions in the ASG and was the main contact for the western 
hostages seized from Dos Palmas resort in May 2001 during the early months of 
their captivity. 
Radulan Sahiron, aka Kumander Putol (Sulu): One of the older generation 
of ASG leaders, the one-armed ASG “Chief-of-Staff” is now in his 50s and 
effectively paramount leader in Sulu (although he does not carry a US bounty). A 
108
former MNLF commander, he joined the ASG in the mid-1990s when its founder, 
Abdurajak Janjalani, sought sanctuary with him on Jolo during AFP operations on 
Basilan. As of September 2003 he was based in Jolo's Patikul municipality with a 
group of 250 men. 
Galib Andang, aka Kumander Robot (Sulu): Nicknamed "Robot" because 
of his stiff gait, former MNLF commander Andang joined the ASG at the same 
time as Sahiron. He rose to international notoriety with the Sipadan hostage 
drama that began in April 2000. He was based in the Indanan-Talipao region of 
Jolo until his capture in December 2003. 
Umbra Jumdail, aka Dr Abu Pula (Sulu): One of the lesser-known ASG 
leaders, Dr. Abu operated in the same area as Andang, although is said to be 
more political.  
In addition to the December 2003 capture of Andang, there have been a 
number of other high profile raids against the ASG's upper echelons.  On 17 
June 2002 Aldam Tilao, better known as Abu Sabaya, a former naval cadet who 
rose to international notoriety with the Dos Palmas kidnappings, was killed in a 
clash at sea off the northern coast of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Sabaya had 
been tracked by a transponder hidden by US intelligence officials in a rucksack 
earlier delivered to him by an informant.  The highest profile success of 2002 was 
the capture of Abdul Mukhim Edris, the ASG's chief explosives expert, who was 
arrested in Manila in November 2002. On 14 July 2003 Edris escaped from his 
cell at Philippine National Police (PNP) Headquarters at Camp Crame, Manila, 
along with one of JI’s leading bombers, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, and another 
ASG convict, Omar Opik Lasal. Edris was recaptured in Lanao del Norte 
province Mindanao on 7 August 2003 but shot dead several hours later while 
reportedly attempting to wrest a rifle from his army captors.  On 18 February 
2003 Mujib Susukan, effectively the ASG's third-ranking Sulu commander, was 
mortally wounded in a firefight in Patikul, Jolo.  On 24 June 2003 an ASG 
logistics officer, Samir Hakim, was arrested in Manila by a joint PNP-military 
intelligence team. Hakim, who had been working as a security guard in the city, 
109
had joined the ASG at its inception. He had been involved in the Dos Palmas 
resort hostage seizure of May 2001 and was allegedly tasked with buying 
weapons on the Manila black market for shipment to Mindanao.  
8. Command Structure  
Guerrillas operate in small units under a single commander. The ASG 
depends largely on the personal powers of leadership of its top five or six 
commanders. Neutralising these men would dramatically reduce the group's 
morale and coherence. Despite the attrition of mid-level operatives, however, 
decapitating the leadership has proved a slow business, complicated by the 
hydra-headed nature of the ASG's loosely co-ordinated commands. 
The secretary general is responsible for co-ordinating all military and 
operational activities. Since the death of Ustadz Abdurajack Janjalani in 1998, 
Khaddafi and Abu Sabaya have taken over command of the Basilan group, which 
is the most important of the ASG's forces. Since the recent events in Basilan, it is 
thought that remnants of the group have reorganised on the archipelago of Sulu. 
The Sulu area is commanded by Abu Jumdail (Dr Abu), Galib Andang and 
Mujid Susukan. The group has become increasingly factionalized; the Basilan 
group was greatly influenced by Ustadz and is viewed as more religiously 
motivated. The Sulu group has been criticized by the Basilan faction for 
concentrating on criminal activity at the expense of strategic goals.  
9. Membership and Support  
Insurgent numbers estimated in mid-2001 at between 800 and 850, had 
been cut back by late 2002 to around 450; and one prominent leader, Abu 
Sabaya, had been killed. As of 2003 only 70 to 80 guerrillas in several bands 
were active on Basilan - a dramatic drop from 460 in mid-2001. On the nearby 
Zamboanga Peninsula of the Mindanao mainland, a further 50 to 70 fighters 
continue to attack both military and civilian targets. The most significant 
concentration of ASG forces is on Jolo, the largest island of Sulu Province. AFP 
sources estimate a hardcore of 250 to 350 armed ASG insurgents divided into 
two main commands remains in the field there. 
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Notwithstanding its terrorist and criminal pursuits, the ASG continues to 
enjoy a support and recruitment base. This pool is undoubtedly far smaller than 
in the movement's halcyon growth days in the mid-1990s, nevertheless a narrow 
support base remains a factor in the movement's stubborn survival. For many 
Muslims in Sulu and Basilan this translates simply into an unwillingness to co-
operate with Christian security forces. 
In the absence of viable economic pursuits, and with the MNLF for all 
military purposes defunct, the ASG holds out the lure of money and adventure 
cloaked in the thin religious legitimacy of jihad. One AFP general summed up the 
root-causes of ASG support on Jolo in three words: "religion, thrills and 
joblessness."  
10. Insurgent Alliances/Linkages  
The ASG occasionally provides cover for international extremist 
movements, most obviously the JI and the wider Al-Qaeda network. Early ASG 
ties to Al-Qaeda associated personalities hinged largely around Ramzi Yousef, 
who was jailed for life for planning the first attack on the World Trade Center in 
1993, and Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and Philippine pointman Jamal 
Khalifa. By the mid-late 1990s these had atrophied as the ASG veered into 
criminality and MILF training facilities in south-central Mindanao proved far more 
attractive for Al-Qaeda and its regional allies. 
Since 2000, links between the ASG and foreign Islamist radicals have 
evidently been revived. Following his November 2002 capture Edris asserted to 
interrogators that in late 2001 he and others had been given "special explosives 
training" on Basilan by two Yemenis. The course had included the construction of 
cellular-phone detonated car bombs. Edris described the pair, who had arrived 
on Basilan in August 2001, as "VIPs from Al-Qaeda". 
As recently as early 2003, according to the accounts of freed hostages, 
two Indonesian instructors were providing the ASG with training courses in 
guerrilla tactics and explosives at mobile sites on Jolo. Former hostage Roland 
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Ullah noted the Indonesians told him they were JI operatives and had themselves 
originally trained in Saudi Arabia. 
Alliances of convenience that the ASG has established with other 
insurgent and criminal factions in the region have undoubtedly facilitated its 
strategic reach. On Jolo this has primarily involved the Misuari Renegade Group 
(MRG) of the MNLF. Some 300 well-armed MRG fighters are based on the 
island, mostly in the Indanan area, and on the basis of clan and family ties, 
relations with the ASG groups are cordial. 
The ASG has also had ongoing contacts with the MILF's so-called "4th 
Division", which fields some 800 to 1,000 guerrillas on Basilan (its 402nd 
Brigade) and a larger number on the Zamboanga Peninsula (401st Brigade). In 
early 2002 the MILF leadership vigorously denied AFP accusations that its 
commanders on Basilan were giving sanctuary to ASG kidnappers holding 
hostages from the Dos Palmas resort. However, the subsequent account of US 
hostage Gracia Burnham left no doubt that from July 2001 captors and hostages 
were given shelter at a MILF camp for several weeks. 
In March 2003, MILF guerrillas participated in an ASG attack on an army 
post outside Lamitan town, according to AFP reports. And on 4 May 2003 
another ASG group was involved in the major MILF assault on the town of 
Siocon on the northern coast of the Zamboanga Peninsula. As the ASG comes 
under increasing military pressure, efforts to tighten these tactical arrangements 
can be expected to grow.  
11. Methods of Funding  
The ASG is suspected to have received funding from Libya, in the form of 
12 million pesos, during the 1990s. The ASG is also suspected to have been 
funded by Mohammed Jammal Khalifa who is married to one of Osama Bin 
Laden's sisters. It is thought that Bin Laden funded the Abu Sayyaf through a 
foundation set up by Khalifa. Al-Qaeda is also suspected of having provided 
arms and training to ASG. Malaysia may also be source of support to ASG. A 
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prominent Malaysian, Sainran Karno, helped to negotiate the release of hostages 
taken by ASG in 2000. 
ASG revenue from ransom of hostages is thought to be very substantial. 
According to some Philippine sources, ASG earned US$20 million from ransoms 
in 2000. The group also extorts money from businesses and individuals and has 
some marijuana growing interests. “Revolutionary taxes” are another source of 
revenue and ASG is thought to derive 5,000 to 10,000 pesos per month from 
businesses in the form of protection money and as much as 4,000 pesos per 
month from individuals.  
12. Area of Operations  
Following US/AFP operations against the ASG, the movement's centre of 
gravity moved southwards from its central base on Basilan to Sulu province. As 
of late 2003 only 70 to 80 guerrillas in several bands were active on Basilan - a 
dramatic drop from 460 in mid-2001. On the nearby Zamboanga Peninsula of the 
Mindanao mainland, a further 50 to 70 fighters continue to attack both military 
and civilian targets. 
The greatest concentration of ASG forces is now on Jolo, the largest 
island of Sulu Province. AFP sources estimate a hardcore of 250 to 350 armed 
ASG insurgents divided into two main commands remains in the field there. 
With a surface area of just 883 km², Jolo is significantly smaller than 
Basilan (1,379 km²), but in terms of counterinsurgency operations it poses 
challenges which are if anything more daunting. Thickly jungled and relatively 
rugged, Jolo is home to a population that is over 95 per cent Muslim, in contrast 
to Basilan where roughly 69 per cent of the 338,000 population is Muslim and the 
rest Christian.  
13. Tactics/Methodology  
The ASG has conducted mass kidnappings, demanding large ransoms of 
several million dollars for foreigners taken hostage. It has also engaged in 
guerrilla activities against Filipino army units and some urban terror tactics 
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including bombings. The group aims to tie down a large percentage of the 
Filipino armed forces but are also known to attack economic targets. 
As the Sipadan and Dos Palmas hostage seizures demonstrated, mobility 
at sea gives small ASG bands strategic reach. At least during the hours of 
darkness the guerrillas still enjoy virtually complete freedom of the seas, moving 
on fast motorized outriggers (bancas) that outrun anything the ill-equipped 
Philippine Navy can put to sea. For reasons of clan loyalty and territorial control, 
most leaders prefer to stay on their home patches, but under pressure they can 
range widely between Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Basilan and the Zamboanga peninsula.  
14. Weapons/Arsenal  
Lightly armed with rifles (often M-16s with attached M-203 grenade 
launchers) and machine guns, ASG units on Basilan and Jolo are intimately 
familiar with terrain, almost constantly on the move and capable of covering 
distances at impressive speed. 
Those groups on Jolo with access to 57 mm and 90 mm recoilless rifles 
now no longer carry them, in the interests of increasing tactical mobility. ASG 
groups generally avoid contact with the security forces, but once a contact has 
begun they react fiercely.  
15. Communications  
ASG members use the dialect Tausung for communication within the 
group. Although some members have been trained in Afghanistan to use 
sophisticated communications equipment, the group relies less and less on 
satellite telephones as they can be monitored by intelligence services. Guerrillas 
use radios when operating in the jungle.  
16. Level of Threat  
Today the ASG is essentially on the back foot: its coffers have been 
substantially reduced since its high-income days and its forces severely cut back. 
Nevertheless it retains a real capacity to rebound, not only to stage further 
hostage seizures but also to tighten existing links with the MRG and MILF 
splinter groups. 
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Ultimately the group's capacity for survival stems from the region's 
festering socio-economic malaise and the political and religious alienation it has 
bred. That suggests that even with additional US training and material aid, the 
AFP faces a long fight that will continue to divert manpower and resources from 
the strategically more pressing challenges posed by the communist NPA and 
MILF to the north. 
 
Table 3.   History/Overview of ASG Campaign 
1991 Abu Sayyaf attacked a military checkpoint in Sumagadang. 
  
1992 ASG member Edwin Angeles abducted a businesswoman in Davao and 
hid her at a residence in Basilan. She was released after paying ransom. 
  
1993 April.  A bus company owner and his five year old grandson were 
kidnapped by ASG. The grandfather was released but the child was held. 
ASG demanded that Catholic symbols be removed from all Muslim 
communities and that a ban be imposed on all foreign fishing vessels in 
the Sulu and Basilan seas. 
  
 
November.  Abu Sayyaf kidnapped an American from his home on 
Pangutaran island and held him for just over three weeks; the government 
denied paying a ransom but admitted to offering food and other supplies. 
  
1994 January.  Ramzi Ahmed Yousef visited the Philippines and is believed to 
have made contact with Abu Sayyaf to discuss plans for an assassination 
attempt on the Pope, who was due to visit the islands.  
  
 
December.  Yousef assisted Abu Sayyaf in a bomb attack on a 
Philippines Airlines flight to Tokyo, during which one person was killed. 
Abu Sayyaf was also responsible for a bomb attack on a church in Davao 
City, during a Christmas service, in which six people were killed and 130 
were wounded. 
  
1995 April.  The group joined forces with guerrillas from the MILF and the 
Islamic Command Council to ambush the town of Ipil, Mindanao. During 
the attack 54 people were killed and a dozen Christian villagers taken 
hostage, then subsequently massacred. 
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1996 December.  There were heavy clashes between Abu Sayyaf and the army 
in Carmen, North Cotabato, and Zamboanga de Norte. 
  
1997 February.  The group was accused of complicity in the murder of a 
Roman Catholic bishop and a bystander in Jolo. 
  
 Armed clashes between Abu Sayyaf and the security forces were 
reported on the island of Basilan. 
  
1998 August.  Following the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 
Abu Sayyaf warned that it would increase its campaign of violence, 
potentially to include foreigners as targets. 
  
 September.  A note found on board an aircraft bound for Kuwait indicated 
that the US embassy in Manila would be bombed. A unit of 10 Abu Sayyaf 
guerrillas was identified in Manila by Philippines intelligence. 
  
2000 The ASG seized and held 21 people as hostages from the Malaysian 
coastal resort of Sipadan. Most were foreign tourists and the group 
demanded the release of several prisoners in the US including Ramzi 
Yousef. Libya mediated an end to the crisis and several million dollars 
was paid to the group from European private individuals. In a later 
incident the same ASG cell seized three Malaysians from a Borneo resort 
and took them to Sulu. 
  
 August.  The ASG kidnapped and accused Jeffrey Schilling, a US citizen 
who met with a senior guerrilla leader, of being a member of the CIA and 
demanded US$2 million for his release. 
  
2001 April.  Jeffery Schilling was rescued. Mr. Schilling, a US citizen who had 
met with a senior guerilla leader, was kidnapped and accused by the ASG 
in August 2000, of being a member of the CIA and $2 million was 
demanded for his release.  
  
 May.  The ASG kidnapped 17 tourists, including three Americans and 
three resort workers from the Dos Palmas beach resort on Palawan 
island, Philippines. When the government attempted to pursue the 
kidnappers, the ASG seized 200 more hostages from a hospital and 
church in Lamitan. 
  
2002 January.  1,200 US troops are sent to the Philippines to support 
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Government action against Islamic militants. 
  
 June.  A group of US-trained Philippine troops stormed an Abu Sayyaf 
jungle camp in an effort to rescue two Americans and a Filipino nurse 
being held hostage. During the rescue attempt, the nurse and one of the 
Americans were killed but the third hostage - US missionary Gracia 
Burnham - escaped with only minor injuries. 
  
 June.  Aldam Tilao, better known as Abu Sabaya, was killed in a clash at 
sea off the northern coast of the Zamboanga Peninsula. 
  
 August.  Six hostages were taken captive by ASG gunmen. Soon after, 
two of the hostages were executed by beheading. 
  
 November.  Abdul Mukhim Edris, the ASG's chief explosives expert, was 
captured. 
  
 December.  Under the pressure of government forces, a number of ASG 
members are reported to have fled the Philippines by means of fast 
watercraft. These persons are thought to have found refuge in Malaysia. 
Soldiers in the region were put on alert to be on the lookout for displaced 
ASG members. 
  
2003 January.  Merang Abante who was reported to be a member of the ASG 
leadership was captured by the Philippine security forces in the south 
Philippines. Soon after, Maid Sampang, an ASG member wanted for the 
killing of eight fishermen, was also captured. 
  
 January.  An additional 200 US soldiers were sent to support the 
operation of government forces against terrorist organizations. 
  
 February.  Mujib Susukan, effectively the ASG's third-ranking Sulu 
commander, was mortally wounded in a firefight in Patikul, Jolo. 
  
 June.  ASG logistics officer, Samir Hakim, was arrested in Manila by a 
joint PNP-military intelligence team. 
  
 July.  Edris escaped from his cell at PNP Headquarters at Camp Crame, 
Manila, along with one of JI’s leading bombers, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, 
and another ASG convict, Omar Opik Lasal. Edris was recaptured in 
Lanao del Norte province Mindanao on 7 August but shot dead several 
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hours later while reportedly attempting to wrest a rifle from his army 
captors. 
  
 December.  Galib Andang, aka Kumander Robot, captured. 
 
C. COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CPP)/NEW PEOPLE’S 
ARMY (NPA)185 
1. Date of Founding  
1969  
2. Status  
Active  
3. Political/Commercial/Charity Front Organizations  
The NPA is the military wing of the CPP. The National Democratic Front is 
dominated by the CPP and is the opposition body used for the conduct of 
negotiations with the government.  
4. Political/Religious Affiliation  
The party is communist and initially followed Maoism; although it 
continues to adhere to the principles of protracted guerrilla warfare through 
peasant insurgency, there have been disputes between the leaders over 
doctrine.  
5. Background  
The origins of the NPA are to be found in the anti-Japanese resistance 
movement. In 1942 the Philippines Communist Party (PKP) established the 
People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Army, known as the Huks. Chinese 
instructors established a training camp in central Luzon. In fact the Huks saw 
relatively little action against the Japanese until late 1944. Once the islands had 
been liberated the PKP used the heightened sense of nationalism amongst its 
supporters, and the established network of resistance, to continue their 
insurgency. The communist leader Luis Taruc (who was later arrested by 
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General MacArthur) declared war on the Quirino regime, and changed the name 
of the resistance movement to the People's Liberation Army, although the rebels 
were still known as the Huks. In the years just after the war they established 
control in a substantial amount of rural territory and the provincial towns in Luzon. 
Improved counter-insurgency techniques by the security services reduced the 
effectiveness of the Huks by 1953, by which time they were seen as a spent 
force. Defense Minister (and later president) Ramon Magsaysay promoted a 
`hearts and minds' policy in rural areas, encouraged guerrillas to surrender, 
undertook land reform schemes and protected peasants rights. 
In 1967-68 the PKP split reflecting Sino-Soviet tensions. Students 
attached to the PKP argued over doctrine during the mid-1960s provoking a rift. 
The Soviet faction was unable to recover from the arrest of its leader Faustino 
del Mundo, and diminished. The Maoist faction became the Communist Party of 
the Philippines (CPP) and established an armed wing in 1969, the New People's 
Army (NPA). The rebels concentrated their activities on central Luzon around 
Tarlac, and then Isabella in the northeast. The NPA numbered more than 2,000 
insurgents by 1971 under the command of Bernabe Buscayno, a veteran 
resistance leader, and Victor Corpus, an army officer who defected to the NPA, 
after seizing the military academy's arsenal in Manila in 1970 and stealing 
weapons. As well as concentrating on protracted rural insurgency, communist 
sympathizers in Manila organized violent strikes against the government. The 
guerrillas were supplied with weapons by China, who also trained recruits - 
people and weapons were smuggled on board fishing vessels through Digoyo 
Bay, northeast Luzon. 
President Ferdinand Marcos imposed marital law in 1972, and rounded up 
thousands of opponents including communist leaders, imposed curfews, 
suspended parliament and controlled the media. What followed was a mixture of 
repression and promises of reform which encouraged some local NPA 
commanders to declare for Marcos. The security forces also concentrated on 
tracking and apprehending communist leaders including Bernabe Buscayno, 
Victor Corpus and Jose Maria Sison. Defecting rebels were rewarded with grants 
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of land, and with the loss of Chinese support, the NPA appeared defeated by 
1977. Remaining leaders allied themselves with Muslim rebels in the south 
fighting with the MNLF. The NPA was able to seized much of the island of Samar 
in 1979. In the 1980s the group again concentrated on protracted rural 
insurgency, targeting groups of villages and persuading them through 
propaganda and threats of violence, to become rebel controlled areas. 
As the corruption and repression of the Marcos dictatorship continued, 
many non-communist Filipinos came to view the ever expanding ranks of the 
NPA as the only viable force for overthrowing the president. In the mid-1980s the 
group was believed to have some 25,000 insurgents, but many were not 
communists. Once Marcos was overthrown in 1986 following a bungled attempt 
at rigging elections, Corazon Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino, became 
president, and the ranks of the NPA began to diminish. It numbered 18,000 
guerrillas by 1992 and fell to around 1,000 cadres in by the end of 1998. 
Aquino's successor, President Fidel Ramos, legitimized the CPP, 
pardoned most of its leaders and allowed it to challenge for political office in the 
country. The government also began a peace process with the group. But in 
1999 the government re-established a military training relationship with the 
United States and the NPA once again resumed armed activities, whilst the CPP 
broke off negotiations. Anti-US sentiment, continued economic difficulties, the 
disastrous presidency of Joseph Estrada and the failure of land reform combined 
to once again see the NPA's membership swell to an estimated 10,000 to 11,000 
guerrillas. The group ambushed and killed 17 Filipino soldiers in August 2000 on 
Negros Island. 
Nonetheless the government persisted with peace efforts, which President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo resumed in April 2001, after the fall of the Estrada 
presidency. She cautioned the US against further inflaming rebel sentiment by 
openly targeting them in the post 11 September War on Terrorism. A Christmas 
2001 ceasefire was agreed and talks resumed in 2002, but the negotiating team 
led by Jose Maria Sison is seen as more conciliatory than guerrilla leaders on the 
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ground who have forced repeated delays in developing negotiations. The naming 
of the NPA as a proscribed terrorist group by both the US and Europe has done 
little to ease tensions, but the presence of US military instructors - supposedly 
assisting in the training of Filipino forces hunting down Islamists from Abu Sayyaf 
- has embittered relations between the NPA and Manila.  
6. Aims/Objectives  
Broadly the NPA aims to establish a communist regime in the Philippines. 
But doctrine and the application of practical policies have been highly divisive 
within the organization and many local commanders have criticized Jose Maria 
Sison for his alleged excessive emphasis on doctrinal matters. In 1994 the NPA's 
Central Committee abolished all party members and units from open legal 
movement except those in Metro Manila. This restricted the ability of groups 
within the NPA from uniting with other groups and addressing specific issues 
where practical reforms could be agreed. The Central Committee also rebuked 
so called progressives within the party and re-emphasized "socialist perspective" 
rather than an "anti-imperialist and anti-fascist" stance as the foundation for unity 
within the CPP umbrella.  The group claims to be structured on "democratic 
centralism ..... to prevent bureaucracy and ultra democracy."  
7. Leadership  
Jose Maria Sison is the chairperson of the CPP and leader of the NPA. He 
served for several years in prison under during Ferdinand Marcos' presidency but 
was released by President Aquino in 1986 as part of an amnesty. He went into 
self imposed exile in 1987 taking up residence in Utrecht, the Netherlands, along 
with the CPP's National Democratic Front director Luis Jalandoni.  
8. Command Structure  
Until the early 1980s the group was renowned for its tight, disciplined 
command structure which was highly centralized. Two factors have eroded this: 
doctrinal differences between leaders, and the distance between those on the 
ground, who are seen as hardliners, and those in exile or the CPP leadership 
who are more conciliatory in the peace process. Breakaway factions have 
emerged, further compromising the command structure and it is estimated that 
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there are at least 33 companies just in Mindanao, each operating under the 
name of the NPA but with a very high degree of autonomy. The forces based in 
Luzon are traditionally more dominant particularly over doctrine and strategy. 
Central command in Luzon issues orders to units under the leadership of a local 
commander. The guerrillas work in small units and it is unusual for the NPA to 
risk committing more than 100 guerrillas to an action or offensive.  
9. Membership and Support  
Estimates of the group's strength in 2002 puts membership at around 
10,000 to 11,000 guerrillas, of whom at least one fifth are under 18 years old.  
10. Insurgent Alliances/Linkages  
The NPA has collaborated with the MNLF on Mindanao before that group 
signed a peace agreement with the government. The decline of communist 
groups elsewhere in the world has diminished fraternal ties with like minded 
organizations in Europe, although the Communist parties of China and Vietnam 
remain allies.  
11. Rival Groups  
The NPA has been targeted by private militias funded by wealthy 
landowners anxious to protect their land wealth and avoid being victims of 
kidnap. The group's ideology also makes it opposed to the religious based 
factions in the southern Philippines - both the Islamist groups (the MILF and 
ASG) and the Christian militias which counter them. There is also much faction 
fighting within the NPA and its offshoots.  
12. Methods of Funding  
The group has two main means of finance: donations given by supporters 
in the Philippines and from remittances of overseas workers; and criminal 
activities. The latter includes extortion rackets which raise revolutionary taxes 
from businesses, kidnap for ransom outfits, smuggling and robbery. From the 
Netherlands, the group is also believed to use charitable donations by leftist, 
non-government organizations to fund the group's activities.  
13. Area of Operations  
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The group's present area of operations are concentrated in the heartland 
of their traditional support: the impoverished and remote mountainous areas of 
central and southern Luzon and the Visayas islands and parts of Mindanao.  
14. Organization  
Jose Maria Sison heads the central committee which supposedly directs 
all CPP and NPA business from exile in the Netherlands. Inevitably, commanders 
on the ground will invariably act with autonomy and much of the criminal activity 
associated with the group is the responsibility of units acting under the NPA 
name. In the Philippines there is a clandestine executive committee which liases 
with the CPP and National Democratic Front. 
CPP is an umbrella organization for labor, student, urban and peasant 
organizations. Its youth arm is the Patriotic Youth. The CPP is highly 
factionalized and riven with internal dissent and breakaway factions. In 1998, a 
new bloc was created under the provisional leadership of Nicolas Magdangal and 
others expelled from the party during the previous year. The two main groups 
within the CPP are the "reaffirmists" loyal to Jose Maria Sison and the 
"rejectionists" who have criticized his leadership or policies. 
The NPA's urban terrorist wing, the Manila Rizal Committee, was 
established initially in the early 1970s and then again later in the decade, despite 
much opposition from the party old guard who viewed the concept of urban 
terrorism as ideologically unsound. This group broke away from the main NPA 
during the early 1980s to form the Alex Boncayao Brigade.  
15. Tactics/Methodology  
The group's tactics are based on Maoist theories of guerrilla warfare. In 
the early 1970s and again a decade later, the NPA targeted clusters of villages in 
remote areas in central Luzon and Tarlac and persuaded them through various 
means to support the group. This allowed them to gain ground whilst avoiding 
challenges with the military which would be costly in manpower. By the 
government's own admission the NPA concentrated on providing community 
programs which accounts for the revival of its support. 
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It has also conducted campaigns of urban terrorism establishing small 
cells (sparrow squads) trained in assassination and bomb making. The targets of 
these squads have included government officials and members of the security 
services, as well as US military personnel and assets. 
The NPA's critics claim that the group is also guilty of internal purges in 
which several thousand people have been killed for "counter revolutionary 
crimes".  
16. Training  
Little is known about the group's training. In the past cadres were 
dispatched to China, and it has been suspected that some may have gone to 
Vietnam, to undergo military and political instruction. The group is believed to 
train guerrillas within the Philippines now, concentrating on political theory, 
weapons use, protracted rural guerrilla warfare and community liaison work. The 
acceptance of child soldiers into its ranks has been criticized and raised 
speculation that discipline and training have been compromised.  
17. Foreign Bases/Supply Lines  
The group has been predominantly self sufficient. It does not have bases 
overseas and has relied on local support networks for food and supplies. In the 
early 1970s guerrillas were trained in China and weapons were smuggled in, but 
Beijing stopped overtly supporting the group by the mid-1970s. The Filipino 
government has accused Vietnam of supplying the NPA with weapons, although 
Vietnam denies this.  
18. Weaponry/Arsenal  
The group has stocks of small arms - including Chinese made AK-47s and 
M-16 rifles - mortars, landmines. The organization lost a large proportion of its 
arsenal when defectors left the NPA in the Marcos era.  
The NPA is believed to purchase weapons on the blackmarket from 
Thailand, and is suspected of having received arms shipments from Vietnam in 
the past. There have also been questions raised over the possibility that the NPA 
received Chinese made weapons via Cambodia. The group also steals weapons 
from police and army patrols.  
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19. Communications  
Jose Maria Sison issues orders and directives to his followers in the 
Philippines using the name Armando Liwanag, which are published in Ang 
Bayan. Copies are available in the Philippines. The group uses several allied or 
sympathetic outlets on the internet and print press including the Maoist 
International Movement and the Revolutionary Workers Online. 
Within rebel strongholds, communications between units are conducted by 
couriers - often women or children - and the guerrillas have radios. Some better 
funded units have cell and satellite phones.  
20. Level of Threat  
The NPA does not pose a threat to the position of the government. 
However the group has a considerable number of guerrillas who are under 
instruction to strike at government and US targets. The peace process has been 
laborious and yielded no permanent settlement yet; even if it does, doubts have 
been raised over the extent to which NPA guerrillas in the country will abide by a 
deal struck between the government and the CPP Central Committee. Poverty, 
anti-US sentiment and corruption in the capital ensure a ready supply of troops to 
the ranks of the NPA. 
 
Table 4.   History/Overview of CPP/NPA Campaign 
1969 The CPP founded a guerrilla wing in March. 
 
1970s The NPA pursued a low-intensity, rural insurgency campaign. The group 
concentrated on Tarlac, central Luzon, then establishing a presence in 
Isabela province in the northeast of the island. The CPP also raised its 
profile in Manila and other urban centers during the 1970s by organizing 
protests and strikes. Radical students increasingly identified with the 
guerrillas. 
 
1974 The NPA killed three US Naval officers near Subic Bay. 
 
1975 Extensive divisions within the organization led to a number of purges; 
improved counter-insurgency operations by the military and police also 
meant that some senior military leaders including Benjamin Sanguyo, 
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Bernabe Buscayno and Victor Corpus, had been captured or surrendered 
by 1976. 
 
1979 The NPA launched a very successful collaborative effort with the MNLF, 




The NPA was responsible for killing 10 US military personnel and 
civilians; it attacked US businesses which refused to comply with 
demands for money. In October 1987, the NPA murdered three US Air 
Force servicemen and a local bystander near Clark air base. 
 
1992 Three factions within the party broke away from the central authority of 
the CPP, following what was described as a "witch hunt" within the party 
for doctrinal deviancy. 
 
1995 July.  The NPA warned that if petrol prices increased oil companies would 
be considered “legitimate targets” for attacks including kidnap and 
assassination (Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Caltex, Petron and the 
Philippines National Oil companies were so threatened). 
 
September.  The exiled leadership was challenged and at least three 
breakaway factions formed a new grouping, the Revolutionary Workers 
Party (RWP). This alliance split again in February 1996 after squabbling 
among the leadership. 
 
December.  The NPA gunned down four leading Chinese businessmen. 
 
1990s With the US military no longer in the Philippines and democratic 
government proving robust, the NPA's popularity diminished, forcing the 
group to concentrate on urban terrorism, largely conducted by the ABB. 
 
1997 The NPA was subject to further disintegration, as the ABB split from the 
Manila-Rizal Regional Party Committee.  
 
1998 April.  Six people were killed during a suspected NPA ambush in Santo 
Cristo, in Bicol. 
 
May.  The NPA announced a ceasefire in line with one declared by the




1999 May.  Communist rebels freed five military hostages in accordance with 
demands made by the president, but then dashed hopes of an early 
peace deal by rejecting other conditions for the resumption of peace talks.
 
June.  The NPA launched two of its most daring attacks for several years, 
ambushing an army platoon in Davao and raiding a police camp on Bohol 
island, stealing a number of small arms. 
 
2000 January.  Jose Maria Sison issued a statement confirming that there 
would be no resumption of peace talks that collapsed in April 1999. 
 
Government peace negotiations focused on forging a dialogue with 
individual communist groups and units within and associated with the 
NPA. However this progress was countered by an ABB attack on an oil 
depot and offices for Petron and Shell. The group was protesting rises in 
petrol prices. 
 
2001 National Democratic Front Chairman Luis Jalandoni stated that he 
ordered the NPA to observe a truce between 17 March and 11 April, to 
help secure the release of Army Major Noel Buan from guerrilla captivity. 
 
The NPA claimed responsibility for the assassination of a congressman 
from Quezon in May and another from Cagayan in June. Following these 
attacks the government suspended negotiations with the National 
Democratic Front. 
 
2002 March.  A senior member of the NPA was arrested in Cebu. Egardo 
Sakamay (Ka Brando) was arrested after an operation by the Army 
Intelligence and Security Unit (ISU) which used former NPA members to 
identify the commander. 
 
July.  The NPA killed two Filipino soldiers and wounded four others when 
their vehicle his a landmine at Samar. 
 
August.  The US added the CPP/NPA to its list of foreign terrorist 
organizations. The decision was made following a visit to the region by 
the US Secretary of State Colin Powell. In response Jose Maria Sison 




November. Jose Maria Sison warned that he doubted a Christmas truce 
would be observed as had been the custom in previous years, given the 
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APPENDIX E: ACRONYMS LIST 
Acronym  Definition 
9/11   September 11th (2001) 
ABB   Alex Boncayao Brigade 
AFP   Armed Forces of the Philippines  
ARMM  Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
ASG   Abu Sayyaf Group 
BIAF   Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces 
CI   Counter-insurgency  
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency  
CPP   Communist Party of the Philippines  
CRS   Congressional Research Service  
CSH   Child Survival Health  
CT   Counter-terrorism 
DA   Development Assistance  
DV   Dependent variable  
DOH   Department of Health 
ESF   Economic Support Funds 
FMF   Foreign Military Financing  
FTO   Foreign Terrorist Organization  
FY   Fiscal Year 
GEM   Growth with Equity  
GMA   Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo  
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GRP   Government of the Republic of the Philippines  
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism  
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome  
IILF   Indonesian Islamic Liberation front  
IMET   International Military Education and Training  
IRO   Islamic Relief Organization  
ISU   Intelligence and Security Unit  
IV   Independent variable  
JI   Jemaah Islamiya 
LEAP   Livelihood Enhancement and Peace  
MBA   Military Base Agreement  
MDT   Mutual Defense Treaty  
MILF   Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
MLSA   Mutual Logistics Support Agreement  
MNLF   Moro National Liberation Front  
MRG   Misuari Renegade Group  
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NGO   Non-Governmental Organizing  
NPA   New People’s Army  
NSCT   National Strategy for Combating Terrorism  
NSS   National Security Strategy 
OIC   Organization of the Islamic Conferences 
PA   Philippine Army 
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PMC   Philippine Marine Corps  
PKP   Partido Komunista Ng Pilipinas  
PNP   Philippine National Police 
PRC   People’s Republic of China  
RP   Republic of the Philippines  
RWP   Revolutionary Workers Party  
SLOC   Sea lanes of communication  
SOG   Special Operations Group  
SPCPD  Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development  
TB   Tuberculosis 
TRAPOS  Traditional politicians  
UN   United Nations  
US   United States  
USAID  United States Agency for International Development  
USDA   United States Department of Agriculture  
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